MCP server · registry snapshot 2026-10-23 · last tested 2026-10-23

dev.tanod/security

Contract and agent-package scans, phishing URL and OFAC checks, domain and header checks. — the publisher's description

1 of 2 record checks metRead-only · tools listed 2026-10-23Topic: security · AI-classifiedPricing: usage-based · AI-classifiedversion 0.1.0streamable HTTP27 tools

Summary

dev.tanod/security is a remote MCP server listed in the official MCP registry at version 0.1.0. On 2026-10-23 ProtocolProbe connected to it in read-only mode and read its inventory: 27 tools, 0 resources and 4 prompts.

Record checks

1 of 2 record checks met · 7 do not apply

met: Registry entry is active and says how to run it
not met: Source repository link opens
not applicable: Repository is not archived
not applicable: Code pushed to the repository in the 90 days before our check
not applicable: Repository publishes a security policy (SECURITY.md)
not applicable: Package names its licence with a standard (SPDX) identifier
not applicable: The version the registry lists can be installed and is not withdrawn
not applicable: npm package carries build provenance (attestation)
not applicable: No known critical or high advisory in the package or its dependencies

Not ranked by downloads: a remote server publishes no download figure
Not ranked by stars: no public GitHub repository

From public records, not a safety rating. Each check with its reason

Key facts

Runs: remote (hosted by the publisher)
Transport: streamable HTTP
Sign-in: none needed to open a session
Tools: 27
Described as changing data: 0 of 27 toolsAI-classified
Mainly works on: accounts and data in outside web services; nothing outside itself: it only answers questionsAI-classified
Topic: securityAI-classified
Pricing: usage-basedAI-classified
Last tested: 2026-10-23

Add to your client

How fresh this is

Live-tested: yes, a real session (not a text-only review)
Last tested: 2026-10-23
Mode: read-only (no tool calls)
Latest version: 0.1.0, published 2026-10-08 (registry, as of the 2026-10-23 snapshot)
First listed version: 2026-10-08 (earliest version still in the registry; older removed versions would be earlier)
Registry data: snapshot 2026-10-23
Package and repository: checked 2026-10-22
Engine: mcp-runtime-engine@0.1.0 · sdk@1.32.0

Changes since the last refresh

New in the registry: not in the list of 2026-10-04, listed on 2026-10-23 with version 0.1.0 (published 2026-10-08).

Source: the official MCP Registry list on 2026-10-04 and on 2026-10-23.

What it is

What does this server offer?

Observed inventory

27tools

0resources

4prompts

What it mainly works on, as our AI model read its tool descriptions: accounts and data in outside web services; nothing outside itself: it only answers questions.

None of its 27 tools are described as changing anything.

scan_contract_sourceon 1 other serverruns code or commands
“pactlint: Scan Solidity source code for security bugs before you deploy, review or depend on it.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
7 inputs
- sourcestring or null“A single Solidity file (no imports; at most 200 KB).”
- standard_jsonobject or null“solc standard-JSON input with inline 'content' for every file (at most 1 MB and 500 files).”
- filenamestring“File name for `source` (ends in .sol; default Contract.sol); findings cite it in file:line.”
- compiler_versionstring or null“Exact solc version (default: from pragma).”
- include_informationalboolean“Also report informational (style and best-practice) findings; default false.”
- include_noisyboolean“Also report detectors dropped by default as noisy (high false-positive rate); default false.”
- include_dependenciesboolean“Also report findings in dependencies, tests and mocks (lib/, node_modules/, OpenZeppelin, ...); default false.”
scan_contract_addresson 1 other serverreads or searches
“pactlint: Scan a deployed, verified contract on Ethereum or Base for security bugs, by address.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world yes
5 inputs, 2 required
- addressstringrequired“Contract address (0x + 40 hex).”
- chainstringrequired“Chain the contract is deployed on.”
- include_informationalboolean“Also report informational (style and best-practice) findings; default false.”
- include_noisyboolean“Also report detectors dropped by default as noisy (high false-positive rate); default false.”
- include_dependenciesboolean“Also report findings in dependencies, tests and mocks (lib/, node_modules/, OpenZeppelin, ...); default false.”
check_contract_before_interactionon 2 other serversreads or searches
“txpeek: Check an address for risk right before you send a transaction to it, approve it, or buy its token (Base or Ethereum).”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world yes
2 inputs, 2 required
- addressstringrequired“Address you are about to interact with (0x + 40 hex).”
- chainstringrequired“Chain the contract is deployed on.”
check_token_honeypoton 1 other serverreads or searches
“chainpeek: Honeypot check: can this token be sold?”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world yes
3 inputs, 1 required
- tokenstringrequired“ERC-20 token address (0x + 40 hex).”
- chainstring“base (default) or ethereum.”
- amount_usdnumber or null“Size of the simulated buy in USD, 1 to 10000 (default 100).”
check_token_safetyon 12 other serversreads or searches
“chainpeek: Use when an agent must decide whether an ERC-20 token on Base or Ethereum is safe to buy or interact with.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world yes
2 inputs, 1 required
- addressstringrequired“ERC-20 token contract address (0x + 40 hex).”
- chainstring“base (default) or ethereum.”
token_verdicton 19 other serversgenerates content
“chainpeek: Token risk verdict in plain language for a Base or Ethereum token, with a shareable card.”
Publisher declares: read-only no · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world yes
3 inputs, 1 required
- tokenAddressstringrequired“ERC-20 token contract address (0x + 40 hex).”
- chainstring“base (default) or ethereum.”
- outputstring“url (default): the file is stored for 24 hours and the reply carries a download link (url, expires_at, bytes, content_type, sha256) instead of the base64, whic…”
check_solana_token_safetyon 1 other serverreads or searches
“chainpeek: Check a Solana token for rug risk: mint and freeze authority, top holders, sell quote.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world yes
2 inputs, 1 required
- mintstringrequired“SPL Token or Token-2022 mint address (base58, 32-44 characters).”
- amount_usdnumber or null“Size of the sell quote in USD, 1 to 10000 (default 100).”
scan_agent_packageon 2 other serversreads or searches
“toolsniff: Scan an AI-agent skill or MCP server package before installing it.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world yes
3 inputs
- sourcestring or null“What to scan: npm:name[@version] | pypi:name[==version] | github:owner/repo[@ref][//subdir] | https://github.com/owner/repo[/tree/ref/dir] | clawhub:[owner/]sl…”
- content_base64string or null“Upload instead of a source: base64 of a .zip/.tar/.tgz/.tar.bz2/.tar.xz archive (max 20 MB decoded) or of one file (then set filename, e.g.”
- filenamestring or null“File name for a single-file upload, e.g.”
check_url_phishingon 2 other serversreads or searches
“chainpeek: Check if a URL or domain is phishing or a scam.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
2 inputs
- urlstring or null“URL, host or domain to screen (at most 2,048 characters); only parsed, never fetched.”
- domainstring or null“Alternative to url: a domain or host name.”
check_urls_phishing_batchon 1 other serverreads or searches
“chainpeek: Check up to 1,000 URLs or domains for phishing or scams in one batch.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
1 input, 1 required
- itemsarrayrequired“1-1,000 URLs, hosts or domains (each at most 2,048 characters); only parsed, never fetched.”
check_sanctionson 8 other serversreads or searches
“chainpeek: screen one crypto address against the US OFAC SDN list's digital currency addresses.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world yes
1 input, 1 required
- addressstringrequired“Crypto address: EVM 0x address, bech32, or a BTC/TRX/other address exactly as listed.”
check_sanctions_batchon 1 other serverreads or searches
“chainpeek: Screen up to 1,000 crypto addresses against OFAC sanctions in one batch.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
1 input, 1 required
- addressesarrayrequired“1-1,000 crypto addresses: EVM 0x (case-insensitive), bech32 (case-insensitive) or BTC/TRX/other exactly as listed.”

Show 15 more tools

detect_proxyon 2 other serversreads or searches
“chainpeek: detect whether a contract is a proxy, and of which kind.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world yes
2 inputs, 2 required
- chainstringrequired“Chain to read.”
- addressstringrequired“Contract address (0x + 40 hex).”
decode_calldataon 5 other serverscalculates or converts
“chainpeek: decode EVM transaction calldata.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world yes
2 inputs, 1 required
- calldatastringrequired“0x-prefixed calldata hex (at least a 4-byte selector).”
- signaturestring or null“Optional signature, e.g.”
get_allowanceon 2 other serversreads or searches
“chainpeek: read an ERC-20 allowance on Ethereum, Base or Robinhood Chain.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world yes
4 inputs, 4 required
- chainstringrequired“Chain to read.”
- tokenstringrequired“ERC-20 contract address (0x + 40 hex).”
- ownerstringrequired“Token holder address (0x + 40 hex).”
- spenderstringrequired“Approved spender address (0x + 40 hex).”
inspect_domainon 5 other serversreads or searches
“dnspeek: inspect a domain's DNS, email authentication and TLS cert in one call.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world yes
2 inputs, 1 required
- domainstringrequired“Domain name (no scheme, no IP literal).”
- checksarray or null“Which sections to run (default all three).”
check_security_headerson 9 other serversreads or searches
“sitepeek: grade a public page's HTTP security headers.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world yes
1 input, 1 required
- urlstringrequired“Public http(s) URL.”
verify_emailon 31 other serversreads or searches
“dnspeek: verify an email address before you send to it or accept it at sign-up.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world yes
1 input, 1 required
- emailstringrequired“The email address to check.”
get_verification_codeon 3 other serversreads or searches
“dnspeek: Get the verification code or magic link from an email without the email body.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
1 input, 1 required
- emailstringrequired“The email as received: raw RFC 822 text with headers (a .eml), or just the body text.”
rdap_lookupon 5 other serversreads or searches
“dnspeek: RDAP (the successor of whois) registration lookup.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world yes
1 input, 1 required
- querystringrequired“A domain (example.com), an IPv4/IPv6 address (1.1.1.1) or an AS number (AS13335).”
text_unicode_inspecton 2 other serverscalculates or converts
“utilpeek: Find invisible, bidi and homoglyph Unicode characters in text.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
5 inputs, 1 required
- textstringrequired“The text (at most 200,000 characters).”
- normalizestring or null“Also return the text in this normalization form: NFC, NFD, NFKC or NFKD (default none).”
- strip_invisibleboolean“Return the text without bidi / zero-width / tag / control characters.”
- list_charsinteger“List the first N code points with name / category.”
- skeletonboolean“UTS #39 confusable skeleton of the whole text.”
check_address_poisoningon 1 other serverreads or searches
“chainpeek: Check a transfer recipient for address poisoning: lookalikes in the sender's history.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world yes
7 inputs, 3 required
- chainstringrequired“ethereum, base or robinhood (Robinhood Chain, chain id 4663).”
- fromstringrequired“The sending wallet whose transfer history is read (0x + 40 hex).”
- tostringrequired“The recipient about to be paid (0x + 40 hex).”
- tokenstring“USDC (default), USDT, or a token contract address.”
- contactsarray or null“Up to 100 addresses you trust (your address book); `to` is compared with them too, without any chain read.”
- lookback_blocksinteger“How many of the latest blocks of history to read (0-2,000; default 2,000, about 67 minutes on Base and 6.7 hours on Ethereum).”
- dust_thresholdnumber or null“Incoming transfers below this many token units count as dust.”
audit_token_approvalson 2 other serversreads or searches
“chainpeek: List a wallet's live token approvals and get revoke transactions.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world yes
6 inputs, 2 required
- chainstringrequired“base or ethereum (the chains with built-in USDC and USDT here).”
- walletstringrequired“The wallet whose approvals are audited (0x + 40 hex).”
- tokensarray or null“Up to 50 token contracts to audit.”
- spendersarray or null“Up to 50 spender addresses whose ERC-20 and Permit2 allowances are read directly on every audited token, however old (tokens x spenders at most 200).”
- lookback_blocksinteger“Latest blocks scanned for approval events (0-6,000; default 6,000, about 3.3 hours on Base and 20 hours on Ethereum).”
- stale_daysinteger“An allowance is stale when the spender pulled nothing from the wallet in this many days (1-3,650; default 90).”
check_wallet_drainon 1 other serverreads or searches
“chainpeek: Check a wallet for a drain: find tokens pulled out without its signature.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world yes
4 inputs, 2 required
- chainstringrequired“base or ethereum (the chains with built-in USDC and USDT here).”
- walletstringrequired“The wallet to check (0x + 40 hex).”
- tokensarray or null“1 to 5 tokens: USDC, USDT or contract addresses.”
- lookback_blocksinteger“Latest blocks read (1-2,000; default 2,000, about 67 minutes on Base and 6.7 hours on Ethereum).”
get_wallet_counterpartieson 1 other serverreads or searches
“chainpeek: List a wallet's top counterparties: who an address sends to and receives from, by count and volume.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world yes
3 inputs, 2 required
- chainstringrequired“base or ethereum (the chains with the wallet-wide transfer-history reader).”
- addressstringrequired“The wallet or contract whose counterparties to list (0x + 40 hex).”
- daysinteger“Latest days of ERC-20 transfers read (1-90; default 30).”
check_text_for_secretson 2 other serversreads or searches
“utilpeek: Scan text for leaked secrets: API keys, tokens, private keys and seed phrases.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
1 input, 1 required
- textstringrequired“The text to scan: a log, a draft post or message, a tool result or a config file.”
repo_infoon 1 other serverreads or searches
“utilpeek: Get health facts for a GitHub repository: activity, licence, dependents, Scorecard.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world yes
1 input, 1 required
- repostringrequired“A GitHub repository: owner/name, github.com/owner/name or https://github.com/owner/name (a trailing .git or / is fine).”

Each quoted sentence is the first sentence of the publisher’s own description. The kind of tool and the “changes data” mark are our AI model’s reading of that description, not something we tested: two differently worded runs had to agree, otherwise no label is shown, and nobody has checked them by hand. A tool without the “changes data” mark is described as only reading, searching or calculating, or the two runs did not agree. No tool was called. Read the publisher’s full description before relying on it. “Publisher declares” lists the hints the server itself sends with the tool (MCP annotations: read-only, destructive, idempotent, open-world); they are the publisher's claims, not checked by us. Inputs are the parameters in the tool's own input schema: name, declared type, whether it is required, and the first sentence of its description. Read 2026-10-23.

How well are its tools described?

Features #4 and #5

How clearly this server's own tool descriptions say what a tool does, and how consistent its tool list is. The first part is an AI model's yes/no reading of each description; the second part is counted. We do not turn it into a grade.

Descriptions

AI reading of each description

Says what the tool does: 100% of 27 tools
Says what it returns: 100% of 27 tools
States limits, defaults or errors: 100% of 12 tools
Says when to use it: 100% of 27 tools
Items covered per tool: 4.0 of 4 on average

Counted from the listing

Parameters with a description: 100% of 73
Tools with a description: 100% of 27
Typical description length: 849 characters

The tool set

Counted from the listing

Tools: 27
Size of the list: about 23,652 tokens for an agent to load (characters ÷ 4)
Naming: 27 of 27 names use snake_case

AI reading: easy to mix up

No pair found.

The AI items cover 27 of 27 tools: for a tool where two differently worded runs disagreed, that item is left out. They were not checked by hand, and no tool was called. “Easy to mix up” means two tools whose names or descriptions overlap without saying how they differ; the AI found none. We do not rate whether the tool set is complete or whether side effects are spelled out, because our AI reading of those was not reliable enough.

How do I add it to my client?

Config from the registry entry

From the remote endpoint (Streamable HTTP)

We connected to this URL on 2026-10-23 (a read-only session: no tool was called).

Add to CursorAn install link in the format Cursor documents, holding the Cursor config below.

Claude Desktop or claude.ai

Settings → Connectors → Add custom connector, then paste:
https://tanod.dev/mcp/security

Cursor · .cursor/mcp.json in a project, or ~/.cursor/mcp.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "security": {
      "url": "https://tanod.dev/mcp/security"
    }
  }
}

VS Code · .vscode/mcp.json

{
  "servers": {
    "security": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://tanod.dev/mcp/security"
    }
  }
}

VS Code (command line) · Bash or zsh terminal (macOS, Linux)

code --add-mcp '{"name":"security","type":"http","url":"https://tanod.dev/mcp/security"}'

Claude Code

claude mcp add --transport http security https://tanod.dev/mcp/security

Try it in the MCP Inspector · runs on your machine, opens in your browser · Node 22.19+

npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector@2.11.0 --server-url https://tanod.dev/mcp/security --transport http

The server runs on the operator's infrastructure; it may ask you to sign in when you first connect.
The MCP Inspector lists the server's tools, resources and prompts; a tool you call there runs for real.

Built from the server's registry entry with each client's documented format (checked 2026-10-14; the Cursor link and the VS Code command 2026-10-19; the MCP Inspector command 2026-10-21). Values in < > are yours to fill in; this page never contains a key. Where the server needs a setting the entry does not declare, it can still fail to start.

Does the registry listing match what we found?

Feature #6

The registry verifies a package once, when it is published, and does not re-check it. A difference below is about the listing, not a judgement of the publisher.

Registry says	We found	Result	Source · date
Remote endpoint tanod.dev/mcp/security	Session opened	matches	our test · 2026-10-23
No credential declared as required	Opened a session without any credential	matches	our test · 2026-10-23

Choosing

Record checks

Public records · not a safety rating

1 of 2 record checks met · 7 do not apply

Not ranked by downloads: a remote server publishes no download figure
Not ranked by stars: no public GitHub repository

MetRegistry entry is active and says how to run itActive, with a package or a remote address.
Not metSource repository link opensThe registry entry gives no repository link.
Does not applyRepository is not archivedNo public GitHub repository to read.
Does not applyCode pushed to the repository in the 90 days before our checkNo public GitHub repository to read.
Does not applyRepository publishes a security policy (SECURITY.md)No public GitHub repository to read.
Does not applyPackage names its licence with a standard (SPDX) identifierRemote server: it ships no package.
Does not applyThe version the registry lists can be installed and is not withdrawnRemote server: it ships no package.
Does not applynpm package carries build provenance (attestation)Remote server: it ships no package.
Does not applyNo known critical or high advisory in the package or its dependenciesRemote server: it ships no package.

Read from public records only: the registry entry, npm/PyPI, GitHub and advisory databases, checked 2026-10-22. No tool was called. Only “met” and “not met” are counted, so the total differs between servers; a check that does not apply or that we could not run is listed, never counted against it. It is not a safety rating. How each check works · Leaderboards

Common questions about dev.tanod/security

Answered from the data above

Is dev.tanod/security free to use?

Its website (tanod.dev/) describes a usage-based pricing model. This is an AI-classified reading of the page on 2026-10-23, so check the page itself before relying on it.

Does dev.tanod/security need an API key or sign-in?

It opened a session without any credential on 2026-10-23. The registry entry declares no required credential; no declaration is not a guarantee.

Has dev.tanod/security been security tested?

Partly. 2 of the 15 checks that apply to it were exercised. We connected and read what the server declares, but did not call its tools: ProtocolProbe calls no server's tools for anything it publishes. This is our choice, not a block by the server. No security verdict is published before verification.

What can dev.tanod/security do?

It lists 27 tools. In our AI model's reading of their descriptions (two runs had to agree, nobody checked it by hand), they include tools that read or search, run code or commands, generate content and calculate or convert. We did not call any tool, so this describes the text, not the behaviour.

Can dev.tanod/security change or delete data?

None of its 27 tools is described as changing anything (our AI model's reading of the descriptions; nobody checked it by hand). We did not call any tool.

Found this page useful?

Anonymous · no sign-in

A quick, anonymous reaction — no account, no email. One per kind from your browser. The tally updates when the page is next refreshed, and it is only a rough count, never a safety rating or a measured number of people.

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Active servers whose topic is also “security” and that have at least one tool of the same kind; most kinds in common first, then most GitHub stars. The topic and the tool kinds are an AI model's reading of the publishers' descriptions, not checked by hand. Similar is not a recommendation.

Compare with another server

Side by side: registry entry, our read-only session, the tools and the 18 classification fields. Same values as each page; no score.

Security testing

What did we test, and what did we leave out?

18 checks · features #1, #2

Not probed (we call no server's tools)

We connected and read what the server declares, but did not call its tools: ProtocolProbe calls no server's tools for anything it publishes. This is our choice, not a block by the server. No security score is given; a check we did not run is never counted as passed.

The 18 checks at a glanceour test · 2026-10-23

Inventory: exercised
Hidden instructions: exercised
Real execution: not run · our policy
Secret leak: not run · nothing to check it against
Internal addresses: not run · our policy
Unconfirmed changes: not run · our policy
Bad input: not run · our policy
Model requests: not run · nothing to check it against
Sensitive questions: not run · nothing to check it against
Folder boundary: not run · our policy
Log leaks: not run · nothing to check it against
Hidden content: not run · nothing to check it against
Fake assistant turns: not run · an error was returned
Token passthrough: not applicable
Token audience: not applicable
Sign-in redirect: not run · our policy
Consent handling: not testable from outside
Sign-in metadata: not applicable

2 exercised13 not run (reason given)3 not applicable

Each check ends in exactly one state: exercised, not run (with the reason), or not applicable (with the reason). 2 of the 15 checks that apply to it were exercised. We do not publish security-check outcomes for named servers.

Exercised · 2

1Inventory
tool-listReads the declared tools, resources and prompts.exercised
2Hidden instructions
description-poisoningLooks for hidden instructions in tool descriptions.exercised

Not run, with the reason · 13

3Real execution
real-executionCalls a tool and checks what really happens.This check calls the server's tools. ProtocolProbe calls no server's tools for anything it publishes; an operator can run this check on their own server with our self-test command.not run · our policy
4Secret leak
canary-leakPlants a fake secret and checks whether it leaks.This check needs at least one successful tool call to have something to check, and no tool was called.not run · nothing to check it against
5Internal addresses
ssrfChecks whether a tool can be steered to internal addresses.This check calls the server's tools. ProtocolProbe calls no server's tools for anything it publishes; an operator can run this check on their own server with our self-test command.not run · our policy
6Unconfirmed changes
write-without-confirmationChecks whether tools that change data act without asking.This check calls the server's tools. ProtocolProbe calls no server's tools for anything it publishes; an operator can run this check on their own server with our self-test command.not run · our policy
7Bad input
error-handlingSends bad input and watches how the server answers.This check calls the server's tools. ProtocolProbe calls no server's tools for anything it publishes; an operator can run this check on their own server with our self-test command.not run · our policy
8Model requests
samplingChecks whether the server asks the client's model to act for it.This check needs at least one successful tool call to have something to check, and no tool was called.not run · nothing to check it against
9Sensitive questions
elicitation-sensitive-dataChecks whether the server asks users for sensitive data.This check needs at least one successful tool call to have something to check, and no tool was called.not run · nothing to check it against
10Folder boundary
root-boundaryChecks whether the server reaches outside the folders it was given.This check calls the server's tools. ProtocolProbe calls no server's tools for anything it publishes; an operator can run this check on their own server with our self-test command.not run · our policy
11Log leaks
logging-side-channelChecks whether log messages carry data they should not.This check needs at least one successful tool call to have something to check, and no tool was called.not run · nothing to check it against
12Hidden content
audience-hidingChecks resources that hide content from the user.This check needs content the server returns, and nothing was read or called.not run · nothing to check it against
13Fake assistant turns
fake-assistant-turnChecks prompts that pose as the assistant's own words.The server returned an error when its prompts were read.not run · an error was returned
16Sign-in redirect
open-redirectChecks the sign-in redirect for abuse.Testing the sign-in redirect means sending probes to the operator's sign-in service, which we do not do.not run · our policy
17Consent handling
confused-deputyChecks consent handling when one service acts for another.Depends on the operator's own consent screen, which differs per server and cannot be tested from outside.not testable from outside

Does not apply to this server · 3

14Token passthrough
token-passthroughChecks whether the server forwards a user's token to other services.The server opened a session without sign-in, so there is no token flow to check.not applicable
15Token audience
token-audience-validationChecks whether tokens meant for another service are accepted.The server opened a session without sign-in, so there is no token flow to check.not applicable
18Sign-in metadata
oauth-url-schemeChecks the published sign-in metadata for unsafe URLs.No sign-in (OAuth) metadata is published, so there are no sign-in addresses to check.not applicable

Source: our own test, 2026-10-23, mcp-runtime-engine@0.1.0. Which checks count and why follows our published scoring model.

What happened during the test?

Feature #8

The steps in order, as the test record holds them.

0 msStarted a read-only session with the server's remote endpoint
228 msConnected after 0 redirects. No credential was sent or needed.
Read the inventory: 27 tools, 0 resources, 4 prompts.
2,635 msFinished: 2 checks exercised.

Reference

How is it classified?

18 fields

One value per field, each with its source. Fields written by AI models are marked. A field with no value says why.

TopicAI-classified

security

AI-classified · 2026-10-23

Pricing modelAI-classified

usage-based

read from tanod.dev/ · 2026-10-23

“282 pay-per-call tools for agents: security checks, PDFs and documents, web pages, chain data. Try a free call from your terminal →”

Programming language

does not apply

no existing GitHub repository (server declares no repository link, so there is nothing to fetch)

Hosting type

remote (hosted by the publisher)

registry · 2026-10-23

MCP capability

prompts, resources, tools

our test · 2026-10-23

Transport

streamable HTTP

registry · 2026-10-23

Required credentials

none declared

registry · no declaration is not a guarantee

Package registry

does not apply

remote-only server: no package is shipped, so there is no package registry

Freshness

0–30 days

registry updatedAt · 2026-10-23

Lifecycle status

active

registry · 2026-10-23

License class

does not apply

remote-only server: ships no package, so there is nothing to look up in a package registry

Integrity hash

does not apply

remote-only server: ships no package, so there is nothing to look up in a package registry

Signature / provenance

does not apply

remote-only server: ships no package, so there is nothing to look up in a package registry

Dependency advisories

does not apply

ships no package, so there are no dependencies to audit

Popularity

does not apply

remote-only server: ships no package, so there is nothing to look up in a package registry

Publisher signals

not stated

no readable GitHub owner to describe

Maintenance

does not apply

server declares no repository link, so there is nothing to fetch

Environment

the publisher's infrastructure

where it runs, from the hosting type

“Not stated” means the source did not state it; “does not apply” means it does not apply to this kind of server; “our limit” means our own lookup failed. A linked value opens the directory filtered to the same value.

Cite or correct this page

Sources and corrections

Suggested citation

ProtocolProbe. “dev.tanod/security: MCP server record.” Data checked 2026-10-23. https://protocolprobe.com/mcp/servers/dev.tanod/security

Figures are valid for the date shown. Our facts on this page are CC BY 4.0: reuse them with a link and the check date. Quoted text (the publisher’s descriptions, website quotes, tool names) is not ours to license.

As JSON: this record in the API · API documentation.

Badge for your README

[![ProtocolProbe](https://protocolprobe.com/api/v1/badge/dev.tanod/security)](https://protocolprobe.com/mcp/servers/dev.tanod/security)

It shows this server's record-check count: facts from public records, no tool called. It is not a security rating or a pass. It links here and updates after each data reload.

Something wrong, or is this yours?

If a fact here is wrong, tell us and we will re-check it. If you operate this server, you can run our checks on it yourself with the free self-test command; we call no server’s tools ourselves for anything shown here.

Write to hello@protocolprobe.com · corrections log · methodology