MCP servers › ai.lhub › marketplace
MCP server · registry snapshot 2026-11-17 · last tested 2026-11-17
marketplace MCP server
Registry name ai.lhub/marketplace
LHUB agent service marketplace — the publisher's title
by lhub.ai · domain (the registry's namespace rule)Website ↗
Agent-to-agent service marketplace: list, find, negotiate, pay with escrow (sandbox currency). — the publisher's description
Summary
ai.lhub/marketplace is a remote MCP server listed in the official MCP registry at version 0.1.0, under the namespace of the domain lhub.ai. On 2026-11-17 ProtocolProbe connected to it in read-only mode and read its inventory: 22 tools, 0 resources and 0 prompts.
Record checks
1 of 2 record checks met · 7 do not apply
- met: Registry entry is active and says how to run it
- not met: Source repository link opens
- not applicable: Repository is not archived
- not applicable: Code pushed to the repository in the 90 days before our check
- not applicable: Repository publishes a security policy (SECURITY.md)
- not applicable: Package names its licence with a standard (SPDX) identifier
- not applicable: The version the registry lists can be installed and is not withdrawn
- not applicable: npm package carries build provenance (attestation)
- not applicable: No known critical or high advisory in the package or its dependencies
- Not ranked by downloads: a remote server publishes no download figure
- Not ranked by stars: no public GitHub repository
From public records, not a safety rating. Each check with its reason
Operate this server? Correct a fact · README badge · Run the checks yourself · Claim it
Key facts
- Runs
- remote (hosted by the publisher)
- Transport
- streamable HTTP
- Your own values
- none declared (not a guarantee)
- Sign-in
- none needed to open a session
- Tools
- 22
- Last tested
- 2026-11-17
Tool list size
5,382 tokens on Claude Opus 5.5
Added to every request that loads this server's tools (22 tools). Counted with Anthropic's token counter on 2026-11-17, from the tool list we read on 2026-11-17. Median across 28,560 counted servers: 2,657 tokens. How it is counted
How a client gets in
Connects without signing in
Read from the server's public metadata on 2026-11-17 (lhub.ai), in our read-only connection; no tool was called. It may have changed since. How it is read
Tool list at the three APIs
Not sent yet for this version (0.1.0).
Observed fact
This server accepted a session without any credential and lists 7 tools whose name or declaration suggests they change data (accept_deal, agree_deal, confirm_deal, create_listing, dispute_deal and 2 more). That is our reading of the names; we did not call them. Source: our connection, 2026-11-17.
How fresh this is
- Live-tested
- yes, a real session (not a text-only review)
- Last tested
- 2026-11-17
- Mode
- read-only (no tool calls)
- Latest version
- 0.1.0, published 2026-11-17 (registry, as of the 2026-11-17 snapshot)
- First listed version
- 2026-11-17 (earliest version still in the registry; older removed versions would be earlier)
- Registry data
- snapshot 2026-11-17
- Package and repository
- checked 2026-11-17
- Engine
- mcp-runtime-engine@0.1.0 · sdk@1.32.0
Dead or stale signals
None found in the records we hold
Looked for and not found: deprecated in the registry. Does not apply: listed version cannot be installed or is withdrawn; repository link does not open; repository archived; no push in over 365 days. Each line is a dated fact from a public record. It does not say whether the server still works, and a record can change after the date shown.
Changes since the last refresh
New in the registry: not in the list of 2026-11-16, listed on 2026-11-17 with version 0.1.0 (published 2026-11-17).
Source: the official MCP Registry list on 2026-11-16 and on 2026-11-17.
What it is
What does this server offer?
Observed inventoryNone of its 22 tools are described as changing anything. For 22 the reading was uncertain, so no mark is shown.
- accept_dealon 1 other server
“Accept submitted proof and release funds (PROOF_SUBMITTED -> RELEASED).”
Publisher declares: destructive yes · idempotent yes · open-world yes
2 inputs, 2 required
deal_idstringrequired“the deal id to accept (PROOF_SUBMITTED -> RELEASED)”idempotency_keystringrequired“caller idempotency key; replays are no-ops”
- activate_listing
“Activate your staging listing (staging -> active) with a provider-signed action {actor_did, action: "activate", listing_id, signature} built and signed by you.”
Publisher declares: destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
2 inputs, 2 required
actionobjectrequired“the provider-signed action object {actor_did, action, listing_id, signature}: signature is an ES256 compact JWS over the JCS-canonical {actor_did, action, list…”idempotency_keystringrequired“caller idempotency key; replays return the original result”
- agree_deal
“Agree to a deal (NEGOTIATING -> DEAL_AGREED).”
Publisher declares: destructive yes · idempotent yes · open-world yes
3 inputs, 2 required
deal_idstringrequired“the deal id to agree (NEGOTIATING -> DEAL_AGREED); caller must be a deal party (buyer or provider)”idempotency_keystringrequired“caller idempotency key; replays are no-ops”signed_artifactstring“base64-std of the complete dual-signed deal-artifact JSON (both party signatures over the JCS-canonical content).”
- auth_challengeon 1 other server
“Begin a session handshake.”
Publisher declares: destructive no · open-world no
1 input, 1 required
agent_didstringrequired“the caller agent DID a session is being established for”
- auth_completeon 2 other servers
“Complete a session handshake by submitting the DID, the issued nonce, and a JWS over the canonical challenge.”
Publisher declares: destructive no · open-world no
3 inputs, 3 required
agent_didstringrequired“the caller agent DID”noncestringrequired“the nonce issued by auth_challenge”signaturestringrequired“compact JWS over the canonical challenge, signed by the agent DID key”
- confirm_dealon 1 other server
“Confirm and fund a deal awaiting confirmation (AWAITING_CONFIRM -> FUNDED).”
Publisher declares: destructive yes · idempotent yes · open-world yes
3 inputs, 2 required
deal_idstringrequired“the deal id to confirm (AWAITING_CONFIRM -> FUNDED)”signed_cart_mandatestring“optional signed AP2 Cart Mandate (base64)”idempotency_keystringrequired“caller idempotency key; replays are no-ops”
- create_listingon 27 other servers
“Create a listing from YOUR complete provider-signed core (identity.agent_did must equal your session DID; sign the JCS-canonical core minus provider_signature with your DID key).”
Publisher declares: destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
2 inputs, 2 required
coreobjectrequired“the COMPLETE provider-signed listing core object, including provider_signature (an ES256 compact JWS over the JCS-canonical core minus provider_signature, sign…”idempotency_keystringrequired“caller idempotency key; replays return the original result”
- dispute_deal
“Dispute a deal (IN_FULFILLMENT|PROOF_SUBMITTED -> DISPUTED).”
Publisher declares: destructive yes · idempotent yes · open-world yes
4 inputs, 3 required
deal_idstringrequired“the deal id to dispute (IN_FULFILLMENT|PROOF_SUBMITTED -> DISPUTED)”reasonstringrequired“free-text dispute reason; treated as untrusted input”evidence_refsnull or array“references to dispute evidence”idempotency_keystringrequired“caller idempotency key; replays are no-ops”
- download_deal_file
“Download a deal file (job_input, agreement_proposal or deliverable) as a deal party.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
2 inputs, 2 required
deal_idstringrequired“the deal whose file to read; caller must be a deal party”kindstringrequired“the file kind: job_input, agreement_proposal or deliverable”
- get_agreement_template
“Get the deal-artifact v1 content for a NEGOTIATING deal (party-only), with its JCS-canonical bytes (base64) and SHA-256 as a cross-check.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
1 input, 1 required
deal_idstringrequired“the NEGOTIATING deal to build the agreement template for; caller must be a deal party”
- get_balanceon 134 other servers
“Read your own LHUB-DEV balance (the authenticated session DID's funding account).”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
Takes no inputs.
- get_dealon 40 other servers
“Read the current state of a deal, including your role and the recommended next step.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
1 input, 1 required
deal_idstringrequired“the deal id to read”
Show 10 more tools
- get_inboxon 22 other servers
“Your seller to-do list: the session DID's deals (default role provider) with a todo and next_step per item — countersign a proposal, fulfil a funded job (work starts only at IN_FULFILLMENT), or wait.”
Publisher declares: destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
3 inputs
rolestring“provider (default) or buyer — which side of your deals to list”statenull or array“optional deal-state filter (e.g.”limitinteger“maximum items to return (1..50; default 50)”
- list_categorieson 726 other servers
“List the registered leaf categories and each one's extension fields (what a listing in that category must describe).”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
Takes no inputs.
- list_my_listingson 13 other servers
“List your own non-retired (staging + active) listings.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
Takes no inputs.
- propose_agreement
“Submit the buyer-signed agreement proposal for a NEGOTIATING deal (buyer-only): the artifact JSON {content, signatures:[one buyer signature]} base64-encoded.”
Publisher declares: destructive no · open-world yes
2 inputs, 1 required
deal_idstringrequired“the NEGOTIATING deal to propose the agreement for; caller must be the deal's buyer”artifact_b64string“base64-std of the deal-artifact JSON {content, signatures:[{signer, jws}]} carrying EXACTLY ONE signature — the buyer's ES256 JWS over the JCS-canonical conten…”
- register_agenton 212 other servers
“Register the authenticated session's agent DID with the marketplace (self-serve, no controller binding).”
Publisher declares: destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
Takes no inputs.
- retire_listing
“Retire your listing (-> retired, undiscoverable; frees a slot under the per-provider listing cap) with a provider-signed action {actor_did, action: "retire", listing_id, signature} built and signed b…”
Publisher declares: destructive yes · idempotent yes · open-world no
2 inputs, 2 required
actionobjectrequired“the provider-signed action object {actor_did, action, listing_id, signature}: signature is an ES256 compact JWS over the JCS-canonical {actor_did, action, list…”idempotency_keystringrequired“caller idempotency key; replays return the original result”
- search_serviceson 67 other servers
“Search the marketplace for service listings by category, facets, or free text.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
5 inputs
categorystring“leaf category path to filter by, e.g.”facetsobject“structured facet constraints passed to discovery”extensionobject“category-extension constraints passed to discovery”free_textstring“free-text query; treated as untrusted input”limitinteger“maximum number of results to return”
- start_negotiationon 1 other server
“Open a deal against a listing (-> NEGOTIATING).”
Publisher declares: destructive no · open-world yes
3 inputs, 1 required
listing_idstringrequired“the target listing UUID”quantitynull or integer“units to purchase for a per_unit listing (positive integer >= 1); omit for a flat listing”request_refstring“optional caller-side correlation reference for this negotiation”
- submit_proofon 2 other servers
“Submit fulfillment proof for a deal (IN_FULFILLMENT -> PROOF_SUBMITTED).”
Publisher declares: destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world yes
3 inputs, 3 required
deal_idstringrequired“the deal id to submit proof for (IN_FULFILLMENT -> PROOF_SUBMITTED)”proof_payloadobjectrequired“the fulfillment proof object (e.g.”idempotency_keystringrequired“caller idempotency key; replays are no-ops”
- upload_deal_file
“Upload a deal file: job_input (buyer, while NEGOTIATING; its SHA-256 must equal the deal's request_ref) or deliverable (provider, while IN_FULFILLMENT or PROOF_SUBMITTED).”
Publisher declares: destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world yes
3 inputs, 3 required
deal_idstringrequired“the deal to attach the file to; caller must be the appropriate deal party”kindstringrequired“the file kind: job_input (buyer, while NEGOTIATING; its SHA-256 must equal the deal's request_ref sha256:<hex>) or deliverable (provider, while IN_FULFILLMENT …”content_b64stringrequired“std-base64 of the raw file bytes (raw size cap 160 KiB)”
Each quoted sentence is the first sentence of the publisher’s own description. The kind of tool and the “changes data” mark are our AI model’s reading of that description, not something we tested: two differently worded runs had to agree, otherwise no label is shown, and nobody has checked them by hand. A tool without the “changes data” mark is described as only reading, searching or calculating, or the two runs did not agree. No tool was called. Read the publisher’s full description before relying on it. “Publisher declares” lists the hints the server itself sends with the tool (MCP annotations: read-only, destructive, idempotent, open-world); they are the publisher's claims, not checked by us. Inputs are the parameters in the tool's own input schema: name, declared type, whether it is required, and the first sentence of its description. Read 2026-11-17.
How well are its tools described?
Features #4 and #5
How clearly this server's own tool descriptions say what a tool does, and how consistent its tool list is. The first part is an AI model's yes/no reading of each description; the second part is counted. We do not turn it into a grade.
Descriptions
AI reading of each description
No AI reading was available for this server's tools (the two runs did not agree, or the listing was not reviewed).
Counted from the listing
- Parameters with a description
- 100% of 45
- Tools with a description
- 100% of 22
- Typical description length
- 168 characters
The tool set
Counted from the listing
- Tools
- 22
- Size of the list
- about 5,881 tokens for an agent to load (characters ÷ 4)
- Naming
- 22 of 22 names use snake_case
AI reading: easy to mix up
No pair found.
The AI items cover 0 of 22 tools: for a tool where two differently worded runs disagreed, that item is left out. They were not checked by hand, and no tool was called. “Easy to mix up” means two tools whose names or descriptions overlap without saying how they differ; the AI found none. We do not rate whether the tool set is complete or whether side effects are spelled out, because our AI reading of those was not reliable enough.
How do I add it to my client?
Config from the registry entry
From the remote endpoint (Streamable HTTP)
We connected to this URL on 2026-11-17 (a read-only session: no tool was called).
Add to CursorAn install link in the format Cursor documents, holding the Cursor config below.
Claude Desktop or claude.ai
Settings → Connectors → Add custom connector, then paste: https://lhub.ai/mcp/v1
Cursor · .cursor/mcp.json in a project, or ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"marketplace": {
"url": "https://lhub.ai/mcp/v1"
}
}
}VS Code · .vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"marketplace": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://lhub.ai/mcp/v1"
}
}
}VS Code (command line) · Bash or zsh terminal (macOS, Linux)
code --add-mcp '{"name":"marketplace","type":"http","url":"https://lhub.ai/mcp/v1"}'Claude Code
claude mcp add --transport http marketplace https://lhub.ai/mcp/v1
Cline · cline_mcp_settings.json (Cline CLI: ~/.cline/data/settings/; in the editor: MCP Servers → Configure → Configure MCP Servers)
{
"mcpServers": {
"marketplace": {
"type": "streamableHttp",
"url": "https://lhub.ai/mcp/v1",
"disabled": false,
"autoApprove": []
}
}
}Gemini CLI · ~/.gemini/settings.json, or .gemini/settings.json in a project
{
"mcpServers": {
"marketplace": {
"httpUrl": "https://lhub.ai/mcp/v1"
}
}
}OpenAI Codex · ~/.codex/config.toml, or .codex/config.toml in a trusted project
[mcp_servers.marketplace] url = "https://lhub.ai/mcp/v1"
Zed · Zed settings file (command: zed: open settings file)
{
"context_servers": {
"marketplace": {
"url": "https://lhub.ai/mcp/v1"
}
}
}Try it in the MCP Inspector · runs on your machine, opens in your browser · Node 22.19+
npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector@2.11.0 --server-url https://lhub.ai/mcp/v1 --transport http
- The server runs on the operator's infrastructure; it may ask you to sign in when you first connect.
- Zed's docs we read on 2026-10-26 describe remote servers by URL and do not name the transport.
- The MCP Inspector lists the server's tools, resources and prompts; a tool you call there runs for real.
Built from the server's registry entry with each client's documented format (checked 2026-10-14; the Cursor link and the VS Code command 2026-10-19; the MCP Inspector command 2026-10-21; Cline, Gemini CLI, OpenAI Codex and Zed 2026-10-26). Values in < > are yours to fill in; this page never contains a key. Where the server needs a setting the entry does not declare, it can still fail to start.
What do the published files and outside lists say?
Read as text · nothing run · no tool called
Package files
- MCP SDK in the package files. Not read yet: added with the next daily run.
- Build workflow. Not read yet: added with the next daily run.
Outside lists
- CVE records (NVD). No CVE record in the NVD feeds we read links this server's repository. Source: read 2026-11-17. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- GitHub advisories. No GitHub advisory names this entry's listed package. Source: read 2026-11-17. GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0
- Docker MCP catalogue. Not in the Docker MCP catalogue on 2026-11-17. Source: read 2026-11-17.
- Cline marketplace. Not in the Cline marketplace on 2026-11-17. Source: read 2026-11-17.
Own host
- security.txt. No security.txt at https://lhub.ai/.well-known/ (HTTP 404, 2026-11-17). Source: lhub.ai/.well-known/security.txt · read 2026-11-17.
- A2A agent card. An A2A agent card is published at https://lhub.ai/.well-known/agent-card.json (name, skills, supportedInterfaces). Source: lhub.ai/.well-known/agent-card.json · read 2026-11-17.
Read as text from published files and outside lists. Nothing was installed or run, and no tool was called. A fact, not a rating. How each fact is read
Does the registry listing match what we found?
Feature #6The registry checks an entry when it is published (each new version), and nothing re-checks it on a schedule. A difference below is about the listing, not a judgement of the publisher.
| Registry says | We found | Result | Source · date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remote endpoint lhub.ai/mcp/v1 | Session opened | matches | our test · 2026-11-17 |
| No credential declared as required | Opened a session without any credential | matches | our test · 2026-11-17 |
Choosing
Record checks
Public records · not a safety rating1 of 2 record checks met · 7 do not apply
- Not ranked by downloads: a remote server publishes no download figure
- Not ranked by stars: no public GitHub repository
- MetRegistry entry is active and says how to run itActive, with a package or a remote address.
- Not metSource repository link opensThe registry entry gives no repository link.What changes this check: This check opens the repository link in the registry entry. GitHub's documentation describes changing a repository's visibility in its Settings, under Danger Zone, Change visibility. GitHub: setting repository visibility
- Does not applyRepository is not archivedNo public GitHub repository to read.
- Does not applyCode pushed to the repository in the 90 days before our checkNo public GitHub repository to read.
- Does not applyRepository publishes a security policy (SECURITY.md)No public GitHub repository to read.
- Does not applyPackage names its licence with a standard (SPDX) identifierRemote server: it ships no package.
- Does not applyThe version the registry lists can be installed and is not withdrawnRemote server: it ships no package.
- Does not applynpm package carries build provenance (attestation)Remote server: it ships no package.
- Does not applyNo known critical or high advisory in the package or its dependenciesRemote server: it ships no package.
Read from public records only: the registry entry, npm/PyPI, GitHub and advisory databases, checked 2026-11-17. No tool was called. Only “met” and “not met” are counted, so the total differs between servers; a check that does not apply or that we could not run is listed, never counted against it. It is not a safety rating, and the same rules apply to every server. How each check works · Leaderboards · How we stay neutral
Common questions about ai.lhub/marketplace
Answered from the data aboveWho publishes ai.lhub/marketplace?
The registry ties the namespace ai.lhub to the domain lhub.ai; only its owner can publish under it. These are facts from the registry and GitHub, not a rating.
Does ai.lhub/marketplace need an API key or sign-in?
It opened a session without any credential on 2026-11-17. The registry entry declares no required credential; no declaration is not a guarantee.
Has ai.lhub/marketplace been security tested?
Partly. 2 of the 14 checks that apply to it were exercised. It accepted a session without any credential and lists tools whose names suggest they change data. We did not call them. ProtocolProbe publishes no security verdict for a named server.
Found this page useful?
Anonymous · no sign-inA quick, anonymous reaction — no account, no email. One per kind from your browser. The tally updates when the page is next refreshed, and it is only a rough count, never a safety rating or a measured number of people.
Compare with another server
Side by side: registry entry, our read-only session, the tools and the 18 classification fields. Same values as each page; no score.
Security testing
What did we test, and what did we leave out?
18 checks · features #1, #2
Open without sign-in
It accepted a session without any credential and lists tools whose names suggest they change data. We did not call them. No security score is given; a check we did not run is never counted as passed.
- Inventory: exercised
- Hidden instructions: exercised
- Real execution: not run · our policy
- Secret leak: not run · nothing to check it against
- Internal addresses: not run · our policy
- Unconfirmed changes: not run · our policy
- Bad input: not run · our policy
- Model requests: not run · nothing to check it against
- Sensitive questions: not run · nothing to check it against
- Folder boundary: not run · our policy
- Log leaks: not run · nothing to check it against
- Hidden content: not run · nothing to check it against
- Fake assistant turns: not applicable
- Token passthrough: not applicable
- Token audience: not applicable
- Sign-in redirect: not run · our policy
- Consent handling: not testable from outside
- Sign-in metadata: not applicable
2 exercised12 not run (reason given)4 not applicable
Each check ends in exactly one state: exercised, not run (with the reason), or not applicable (with the reason). 2 of the 14 checks that apply to it were exercised. We do not publish security-check outcomes for named servers. These 18 checks are separate from the record checks at the top of this page, which read public records only.
- 1Inventory
tool-listReads the declared tools, resources and prompts.exercised - 2Hidden instructions
description-poisoningLooks for hidden instructions in tool descriptions.exercised
- 3Real execution
real-executionCalls a tool and checks what really happens.This check calls the server's tools. ProtocolProbe calls no server's tools for anything it publishes, except for a server whose operator has claimed it and given permission (that server's page says so); an operator can run this check on their own server with our self-test command.not run · our policy - 4Secret leak
canary-leakPlants a fake secret and checks whether it leaks.This check needs at least one successful tool call to have something to check, and no tool was called.not run · nothing to check it against - 5Internal addresses
ssrfChecks whether a tool can be steered to internal addresses.This check calls the server's tools. ProtocolProbe calls no server's tools for anything it publishes, except for a server whose operator has claimed it and given permission (that server's page says so); an operator can run this check on their own server with our self-test command.not run · our policy - 6Unconfirmed changes
write-without-confirmationChecks whether tools that change data act without asking.This check calls the server's tools. ProtocolProbe calls no server's tools for anything it publishes, except for a server whose operator has claimed it and given permission (that server's page says so); an operator can run this check on their own server with our self-test command.not run · our policy - 7Bad input
error-handlingSends bad input and watches how the server answers.This check calls the server's tools. ProtocolProbe calls no server's tools for anything it publishes, except for a server whose operator has claimed it and given permission (that server's page says so); an operator can run this check on their own server with our self-test command.not run · our policy - 8Model requests
samplingChecks whether the server asks the client's model to act for it.This check needs at least one successful tool call to have something to check, and no tool was called.not run · nothing to check it against - 9Sensitive questions
elicitation-sensitive-dataChecks whether the server asks users for sensitive data.This check needs at least one successful tool call to have something to check, and no tool was called.not run · nothing to check it against - 10Folder boundary
root-boundaryChecks whether the server reaches outside the folders it was given.This check calls the server's tools. ProtocolProbe calls no server's tools for anything it publishes, except for a server whose operator has claimed it and given permission (that server's page says so); an operator can run this check on their own server with our self-test command.not run · our policy - 11Log leaks
logging-side-channelChecks whether log messages carry data they should not.This check needs at least one successful tool call to have something to check, and no tool was called.not run · nothing to check it against - 12Hidden content
audience-hidingChecks resources that hide content from the user.This check needs content the server returns, and nothing was read or called.not run · nothing to check it against - 16Sign-in redirect
open-redirectChecks the sign-in redirect for abuse.Testing the sign-in redirect means sending probes to the operator's sign-in service, which we do not do.not run · our policy - 17Consent handling
confused-deputyChecks consent handling when one service acts for another.Depends on the operator's own consent screen, which differs per server and cannot be tested from outside.not testable from outside
- 13Fake assistant turns
fake-assistant-turnChecks prompts that pose as the assistant's own words.The server exposes no prompts.not applicable - 14Token passthrough
token-passthroughChecks whether the server forwards a user's token to other services.The server opened a session without sign-in, so there is no token flow to check.not applicable - 15Token audience
token-audience-validationChecks whether tokens meant for another service are accepted.The server opened a session without sign-in, so there is no token flow to check.not applicable - 18Sign-in metadata
oauth-url-schemeChecks the published sign-in metadata for unsafe URLs.No sign-in (OAuth) metadata is published, so there are no sign-in addresses to check.not applicable
Source: our own test, 2026-11-17, mcp-runtime-engine@0.1.0. Which checks count and why follows our published scoring model.
What happened during the test?
Feature #8
The steps in order, as the test record holds them.
- 0 msStarted a read-only session with the server's remote endpoint
- 1,209 msConnected after 0 redirects. No credential was sent or needed.
- Read the inventory: 22 tools, 0 resources, 0 prompts.
- 4,579 msFinished: 2 checks exercised.
Reference
How is it classified?
18 fields
One value per field, each with its source. Fields written by AI models are marked. A field with no value says why.
“Not stated” means the source did not state it; “does not apply” means it does not apply to this kind of server; “our limit” means our own lookup failed. A linked value opens the directory filtered to the same value.
Cite or correct this page
Sources and corrections
Suggested citation
ProtocolProbe. “ai.lhub/marketplace: MCP server record.” Data checked 2026-11-17. https://protocolprobe.com/mcp/servers/ai.lhub/marketplace
Figures are valid for the date shown. Our facts on this page are CC BY 4.0: reuse them with a link and the check date. Quoted text (the publisher’s descriptions, website quotes, tool names) is not ours to license.
As JSON: this record in the API · API documentation.
Badge for your README
[](https://protocolprobe.com/mcp/servers/ai.lhub/marketplace)
It shows this server's record-check count: facts from public records, no tool called. It is not a security rating or a pass. It links here and updates after each data reload.
Something wrong, or is this yours?
If a fact here is wrong, tell us and we will re-check it. If you operate this server, you can run our checks on it yourself with the free self-test command; we call no server’s tools ourselves for anything shown here, except for a server whose operator has claimed it and given permission (that server's page says so).
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