MCP servers › io.github.adamgraymon › trustgate-erc8183-mcp
MCP server · registry snapshot 2026-11-19 · last tested 2026-11-19
trustgate-erc8183-mcp MCP server
Registry name io.github.adamgraymon/trustgate-erc8183-mcp
by adamgraymon · GitHub account (the registry's namespace rule)repository: same ownerSource ↗Website ↗
VERITAS-8183 M2M Notary, Free MCP Trust & Skill Audits, 3-Star Seals & 8-Vertical Escrow on Base. — the publisher's description
Summary
io.github.adamgraymon/trustgate-erc8183-mcp is a remote MCP server listed in the official MCP registry at version 0.8.0, under the namespace of the GitHub account adamgraymon. Its linked repository, github.com/adamgraymon/Own_adam, belongs to the same GitHub account. On 2026-11-19 ProtocolProbe connected to it in read-only mode and read its inventory: 23 tools, 5 resources and 0 prompts.
Record checks
4 of 5 record checks met · 4 do not apply
- met: Registry entry is active and says how to run it
- met: Source repository link opens
- met: Repository is not archived
- met: Code pushed to the repository in the 90 days before our check
- not met: Repository publishes a security policy (SECURITY.md)
- not applicable: Package names its licence with a standard (SPDX) identifier
- not applicable: The version the registry lists can be installed and is not withdrawn
- not applicable: npm package carries build provenance (attestation)
- not applicable: No known critical or high advisory in the package or its dependencies
- Not ranked by downloads: a remote server publishes no download figure
- Not ranked by stars: 1 star (ranked from 10)
From public records, not a safety rating. Each check with its reason · Is it safe to install?
Operate this server? Correct a fact · README badge · Run the checks yourself · Claim it
Key facts
- Runs
- remote (hosted by the publisher)
- Transport
- streamable HTTP
- Your own values
- none declared (not a guarantee)
- Sign-in
- none needed to open a session
- Repository
- public
- Tools
- 23
- Last tested
- 2026-11-19
How a client gets in
Connects without signing in
Read from the server's public metadata on 2026-11-19 (own-adam.onrender.com), in our read-only connection; no tool was called. It may have changed since. How it is read
Tool list at the three APIs
Not sent yet for this version (0.8.0).
Observed fact
This server accepted a session without any credential and lists 1 tool whose name or declaration suggests it changes data (register_and_certify_store). That is our reading of the names; we did not call it. Source: our connection, 2026-11-19.
How fresh this is
- Live-tested
- yes, a real session (not a text-only review)
- Last tested
- 2026-11-19
- Mode
- read-only (no tool calls)
- Latest version
- 0.8.0, published 2026-11-19 (registry, as of the 2026-11-19 snapshot)
- First listed version
- 2026-11-15 (earliest version still in the registry; older removed versions would be earlier)
- Version history
- 5 versions listed, 2026-11-15 to 2026-11-19; 5 in the 90 days before the 2026-11-19 snapshot.(versions still listed in the registry only)
Most recent 5 versions
0.8.0· 2026-11-190.7.0· 2026-11-160.5.0· 2026-11-150.4.0· 2026-11-150.3.0· 2026-11-15
- Registry data
- snapshot 2026-11-19
- Package and repository
- checked 2026-11-19
- Engine
- mcp-runtime-engine@0.1.0 · sdk@1.32.0
Dead or stale signals
None found in the records we hold
Looked for and not found: deprecated in the registry; repository link does not open; repository archived; no push in over 365 days. Does not apply: listed version cannot be installed or is withdrawn. Each line is a dated fact from a public record. It does not say whether the server still works, and a record can change after the date shown.
Changes since the last refresh
Version 0.7.0 (published 2026-11-16) → 0.8.0 (published 2026-11-19), between the registry lists of 2026-11-18 and 2026-11-19.
The publisher published no GitHub release note for this version: its repository publishes no GitHub releases.
Source: the official MCP Registry list on 2026-11-18 and on 2026-11-19; release notes from the GitHub Releases API, checked 2026-11-19.
What it is
What does this server offer?
Observed inventoryNone of its 23 tools are described as changing anything. For 23 the reading was uncertain, so no mark is shown.
- check_mcp_server_trust
“[Private query, public score] Is this MCP server safe to connect?”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent no · open-world yes
3 inputs
serverUrlstring“Public https URL of the MCP server to check.”paymentTxHashstring“Optional.”paymentRecoveryTokenstring“Required with paymentTxHash.”
- review_agent_skill_free
“Free static review of an agent skill and related text files, with findings by file, line and rule.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
1 input
filesarray“Text files with a root SKILL.md.”
- get_trust_dossier_sample
“View a fictional example of the full TrustGate dossier and its 0.25 USDC price on Base.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
Takes no inputs.
- discover_verified_storeson 11 other servers
“[Public registry] Find AI data, code and model sellers that already passed an audit, filtered by trust score, category or max price.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
5 inputs
minReputationnumber“Minimum ERC-8004 reputation score (0 to 100).”marketTierstring“Target market lane to filter stores and packages.”verticalstring“Audit vertical category to filter providers.”maxPriceUsdcnumber“Maximum starting price in USDC.”firstPartyOnlyboolean“Return only official TrustGate curated packages.”
- quote_multitoken_escrowon 11 other servers
“[Private] Read-only price quote: how much USDC a seller receives, with fees, if the buyer uses SOL, ETH, VIRTUAL, USDT or USDC.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
2 inputs, 2 required
tokenSymbolstringrequired“Input token symbol to swap and lock.”tokenAmountnumberrequired“Amount of input token to quote.”
- open_escrow_jobon 11 other servers
“[Private] Buying from another agent?”
Publisher declares: read-only no · destructive no · idempotent no · open-world no
5 inputs, 3 required
buyerIdstring“Buyer agent identifier opening the escrow order.”storeIdstringrequired“Target verified store identifier.”tokenSymbolstringrequired“Payment token symbol.”tokenAmountnumberrequired“Token amount to fund into escrow.”minRowsnumber“Minimum dataset rows required for settlement.”
- submit_encrypted_deliverableon 11 other servers
“[Private] Seller: submit the dataset you delivered.”
Publisher declares: read-only no · destructive no · idempotent no · open-world no
2 inputs, 2 required
jobIdstringrequired“Active escrow job identifier (e.g.”rawDatasetJsonStringstringrequired“Serialized JSON array of dataset rows to encrypt and audit.”
- claim_escrow_timeout_refund
“[Private] Buyer: the seller did not deliver before the deadline?”
Publisher declares: read-only no · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
1 input, 1 required
jobIdstringrequired“Escrow job id returned by open_escrow_job.”
- audit_quant_backtest_escrowon 11 other servers
“[Private] Bought a trading strategy?”
Publisher declares: read-only no · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
4 inputs, 1 required
tradesarrayrequired“Array of trade objects with entry/exit timestamps, prices, and PnL.”minTradesnumber“Minimum required trade count for statistical validity.”minProfitFactornumber“Minimum gross profit to gross loss ratio.”maxDrawdownPctnumber“Maximum allowed peak-to-trough equity drawdown percentage.”
- audit_smart_contract_escrowon 11 other servers
“[Private] Is this Solidity contract safe?”
Publisher declares: read-only no · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
3 inputs, 1 required
soliditySourceCodestringrequired“Complete Solidity smart contract source code to compile and scan.”contractNamestring“Target contract name inside the Solidity source.”requiredFunctionsarray“Function names that must exist in the compiled ABI.”
- audit_api_sla_escrowon 11 other servers
“[Private] Did the paid API or oracle deliver what it promised?”
Publisher declares: read-only no · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
4 inputs, 1 required
apiResponsePayloadobjectrequired“Parsed JSON payload returned by the oracle or API.”observedLatencyMsnumber“Measured round-trip response latency in milliseconds.”maxLatencyMsnumber“Maximum allowed SLA latency in milliseconds.”requiredKeysarray“Mandatory top-level JSON keys required by the SLA.”
- audit_agent_skill_escrowon 11 other servers
“[Private] Is this agent skill safe to install?”
Publisher declares: read-only no · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
5 inputs, 1 required
skillMarkdownstringrequired“Full SKILL.md markdown content including YAML frontmatter.”bundledScriptsstring“Optional helper script code bundled with the skill.”requiredSectionsarray“Required frontmatter or markdown headings.”targetAgentIdstring“Optional agent or plugin ID to track version drift history.”versionstring“Semantic version string (e.g.”
Show 11 more tools
- audit_rag_embeddings_escrowon 11 other servers
“[Private] Are these RAG chunks and embeddings usable and clean?”
Publisher declares: read-only no · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
3 inputs, 1 required
chunksarrayrequired“Array of RAG objects containing text and numeric embedding arrays.”expectedDimensionnumber“Expected vector length for every embedding.”minChunksnumber“Minimum required number of valid knowledge chunks.”
- audit_ai_inference_escrowon 11 other servers
“[Private] Were you overbilled or served a cheaper model?”
Publisher declares: read-only no · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
5 inputs, 1 required
responseTextstringrequired“Generated text output returned by the inference provider.”billedOutputTokensnumber“Number of output tokens billed by the provider.”mustIncludeTermsarray“Keywords or phrases that must appear in the output.”forbiddenTermsarray“Terms that must not appear in the output.”minUniqueWordRationumber“Minimum lexical diversity ratio (0 to 1) to detect model downgrade.”
- audit_depin_gpu_sla_escrowon 11 other servers
“[Private] Is the rented GPU really what you paid for?”
Publisher declares: read-only no · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
5 inputs, 1 required
benchmarkReportobjectrequired“Hardware telemetry object with measuredTflopsFp16, availableVramGb, and gpuTempCelsius.”minTflopsFp16number“Minimum required FP16 compute throughput in TFLOPS.”minVramGbnumber“Minimum required GPU VRAM in gigabytes.”minMemoryBandwidthGbsnumber“Minimum memory bandwidth in GB/s.”maxTempCelsiusnumber“Maximum safe GPU operating temperature in Celsius.”
- verify_onchain_escrow_statuson 11 other servers
“[Public] Proof that this service is real: verified Base contract (Sourcify), signed agent passport and fee terms.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
1 input
includeReceiptsboolean“Include Sourcify and LEGION Merkle inclusion receipts.”
- purchase_firstparty_catalog_itemon 11 other servers
“[Private] Buy an official dataset, security scanner or tutorial pack, paid in USDC on Base and delivered decrypted.”
Publisher declares: read-only no · destructive no · idempotent no · open-world yes
4 inputs, 1 required
itemIdstringrequired“Catalog package identifier to unlock.”buyerIdstring“Buyer agent ID claiming the package.”paymentTokenstring“Settlement token symbol.”paymentTxHashstring“Base Mainnet USDC transaction hash (0x...) paying the package price.”
- register_and_certify_storeon 11 other servers
“[Public registry, consent required] Sell to other agents: list your store for free after passing an automated quality audit.”
Publisher declares: read-only no · destructive no · idempotent no · open-world no
9 inputs, 2 required
acceptPublicRegistryTermsbooleanrequired“Required: true.”storeIdstringrequired“Unique slug identifier for the store.”storeNamestring“Display name of the AI provider node.”walletAddressstring“Payout wallet address on Base Mainnet.”endpointUrlstring“MCP or A2A delivery endpoint URL.”verticalstring“Primary service vertical to certify.”marketTierstring“Target market tier.”startingPriceUsdcnumber“Base order price in USDC.”sampleDeliverableobject“Sample deliverable payload to verify deterministically before listing.”
- inspect_veritas_8183_sealon 4 other servers
“[Public registry] Before trusting a seller: see its 1-3 star seal, reserve ratio, trust history and whether risky actions would be blocked.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
9 inputs
targetIdstring“Store ID, agent ID, or 'ALL' for the full directory.”roleFilterstring“Filter directory output by SELLER or BUYER.”proposedTransactionAmountUsdcnumber“Optional USDC amount to check against buyer FinOps spend caps.”buyerIdForSimulationstring“Buyer agent ID for bilateral pre-check or single-use unlock.”callerSectorOrTrendstring“Single industry sector or keyword to query radar search intelligence.”forensicUnlockTokenstring“Single-use unlock token issued by manage_buyer_finops_spend_passport.”versionToInspectOrUpdatestring“Agent version string to inspect for behavioral drift (v1 vs v2).”simulatedUpdateBehaviorobject“Optional update payload to evaluate version drift before deployment.”preExecutionCallCheckobject“Optional tool call payload to evaluate in the pre-execution firewall.”
- submit_veritas_tier_upgrade_examon 4 other servers
“[Public registry] Seller: take the exam (reserves, code purity, ratings, latency) to earn 1 to 3 trust stars that buyers can see.”
Publisher declares: read-only no · destructive no · idempotent no · open-world no
9 inputs, 1 required
storeIdstringrequired“Candidate store identifier.”storeNamestring“Display name of the candidate node.”walletAddressstring“Primary operational wallet address.”publicReserveWalletstring“Public wallet holding auditable crypto reserves.”declaredPublicReserveUsdcnumber“Liquid crypto reserve balance in USDC equivalent.”declaredMonthlyVolumeUsdcnumber“Monthly operational volume in USDC (>=20% reserve ratio required for 3 Stars).”verticalstring“Technical vertical for the live exam.”observedLatencyMsnumber“Measured P95 response latency in milliseconds.”sampleDeliverableobject“Deliverable sample to audit during the exam.”
- manage_buyer_finops_spend_passporton 4 other servers
“[Private by default] Protect your budget: set per-payment and daily USDC limits for your agent and compare LLM costs.”
Publisher declares: read-only no · destructive no · idempotent no · open-world no
10 inputs
listMeInBuyerDirectoryboolean“Optional, default private.”buyerIdstring“Unique buyer agent identifier.”buyerNamestring“Human-readable name of the buyer agent.”walletAddressstring“Buyer wallet address.”maxSpendPerTxUsdcnumber“Maximum authorized spend per transaction in USDC.”dailySpendCapUsdcnumber“Maximum authorized daily spend cap in USDC.”lookingToBuyVerticalsarray“Verticals this buyer is actively purchasing.”activeRfqDescriptionstring“Brief procurement requirement description for 2★/3★ sellers.”proposedPurchaseUsdcnumber“Optional purchase amount to test against FinOps caps and VIP discounts.”estimatedPromptTokensnumber“Token count to benchmark LLM inference cost across providers.”
- notarize_and_witness_a2a_dealon 4 other servers
“[Public record, private content] Get a signed receipt that proves a deal between two agents happened, or buy a small paid service (0.10-1.00 USDC).”
Publisher declares: read-only no · destructive no · idempotent no · open-world yes
9 inputs
serviceIdstring“Micro-bazaar service or notary action to execute.”buyerIdstring“Buyer agent identifier.”sellerStoreIdstring“Counterparty seller store identifier.”dealAmountUsdcnumber“Transaction value in USDC being witnessed.”deliverableSha256string“SHA-256 hash of the delivered payload.”clientRatingOutOf5number“Verified buyer rating (1.0 to 5.0) for the seller.”clientReviewCommentstring“Short post-delivery review note.”targetSectorOrKeywordstring“Single sector or keyword to unlock when serviceId is 'x402-radar-single-sector-intel'.”paymentTxHashstring“Base Mainnet USDC transfer transaction hash (0x...).”
- match_verified_buyers_by_intent
“[Opt-in buyers only] Seller: find buyers who have budget for what you sell in your category; your first 3 matches have no extra fee.”
Publisher declares: read-only no · destructive no · idempotent no · open-world no
7 inputs, 1 required
sellerStoreIdstringrequired“Registered seller store ID holding a 2★ or 3★ VERITAS-8183 Seal.”minAvailableBudgetUsdcnumber“Minimum verified remaining daily USDC budget required.”targetVerticalstring“Vertical category to match buyer intent.”minPaymentReliabilityPctnumber“Minimum historical payment completion percentage (0 to 100).”connectAndCloseDealWithBuyerIdstring“Optional buyer ID to send a direct pitch and close a matched order.”dealAmountUsdcnumber“Proposed order amount in USDC when closing a matched deal.”directOfferPitchstring“Short offer message sent to the matched buyer.”
Each quoted sentence is the first sentence of the publisher’s own description. The kind of tool and the “changes data” mark are our AI model’s reading of that description, not something we tested: two differently worded runs had to agree, otherwise no label is shown, and nobody has checked them by hand. A tool without the “changes data” mark is described as only reading, searching or calculating, or the two runs did not agree. No tool was called. Read the publisher’s full description before relying on it. “Publisher declares” lists the hints the server itself sends with the tool (MCP annotations: read-only, destructive, idempotent, open-world); they are the publisher's claims, not checked by us. Inputs are the parameters in the tool's own input schema: name, declared type, whether it is required, and the first sentence of its description. Read 2026-11-19.
How well are its tools described?
Features #4 and #5
How clearly this server's own tool descriptions say what a tool does, and how consistent its tool list is. The first part is an AI model's yes/no reading of each description; the second part is counted. We do not turn it into a grade.
Descriptions
AI reading of each description
No AI reading was available for this server's tools (the two runs did not agree, or the listing was not reviewed).
Counted from the listing
- Parameters with a description
- 100% of 106
- Tools with a description
- 100% of 23
- Typical description length
- 182 characters
The tool set
Counted from the listing
- Tools
- 23
- Size of the list
- about 5,831 tokens for an agent to load (characters ÷ 4)
- Naming
- 23 of 23 names use snake_case
AI reading: easy to mix up
No pair found.
The AI items cover 0 of 23 tools: for a tool where two differently worded runs disagreed, that item is left out. They were not checked by hand, and no tool was called. “Easy to mix up” means two tools whose names or descriptions overlap without saying how they differ; the AI found none. We do not rate whether the tool set is complete or whether side effects are spelled out, because our AI reading of those was not reliable enough.
How do I add it to my client?
Config from the registry entry
From the remote endpoint (Streamable HTTP)
We connected to this URL on 2026-11-19 (a read-only session: no tool was called).
Add to CursorAn install link in the format Cursor documents, holding the Cursor config below.
Claude Desktop or claude.ai
Settings → Connectors → Add custom connector, then paste: https://own-adam.onrender.com/mcp
Cursor · .cursor/mcp.json in a project, or ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"trustgate-erc8183-mcp": {
"url": "https://own-adam.onrender.com/mcp"
}
}
}VS Code · .vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"trustgate-erc8183-mcp": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://own-adam.onrender.com/mcp"
}
}
}VS Code (command line) · Bash or zsh terminal (macOS, Linux)
code --add-mcp '{"name":"trustgate-erc8183-mcp","type":"http","url":"https://own-adam.onrender.com/mcp"}'Claude Code
claude mcp add --transport http trustgate-erc8183-mcp https://own-adam.onrender.com/mcp
Cline · cline_mcp_settings.json (Cline CLI: ~/.cline/data/settings/; in the editor: MCP Servers → Configure → Configure MCP Servers)
{
"mcpServers": {
"trustgate-erc8183-mcp": {
"type": "streamableHttp",
"url": "https://own-adam.onrender.com/mcp",
"disabled": false,
"autoApprove": []
}
}
}Gemini CLI · ~/.gemini/settings.json, or .gemini/settings.json in a project
{
"mcpServers": {
"trustgate-erc8183-mcp": {
"httpUrl": "https://own-adam.onrender.com/mcp"
}
}
}OpenAI Codex · ~/.codex/config.toml, or .codex/config.toml in a trusted project
[mcp_servers.trustgate-erc8183-mcp] url = "https://own-adam.onrender.com/mcp"
Zed · Zed settings file (command: zed: open settings file)
{
"context_servers": {
"trustgate-erc8183-mcp": {
"url": "https://own-adam.onrender.com/mcp"
}
}
}Try it in the MCP Inspector · runs on your machine, opens in your browser · Node 22.19+
npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector@2.11.0 --server-url https://own-adam.onrender.com/mcp --transport http
- The server runs on the operator's infrastructure; it may ask you to sign in when you first connect.
- Zed's docs we read on 2026-10-26 describe remote servers by URL and do not name the transport.
- The MCP Inspector lists the server's tools, resources and prompts; a tool you call there runs for real.
Built from the server's registry entry with each client's documented format (checked 2026-10-14; the Cursor link and the VS Code command 2026-10-19; the MCP Inspector command 2026-10-21; Cline, Gemini CLI, OpenAI Codex and Zed 2026-10-26). Values in < > are yours to fill in; this page never contains a key. Where the server needs a setting the entry does not declare, it can still fail to start.
What do the published files and outside lists say?
Read as text · nothing run · no tool called
Package files
- MCP SDK in the package files. Not read yet: added with the next daily run.
- Build workflow. Not read yet: added with the next daily run.
Outside lists
- CVE records (NVD). No CVE record in the NVD feeds we read links this server's repository. Source: read 2026-11-19. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- GitHub advisories. No GitHub advisory names this entry's listed package. Source: read 2026-11-19. GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0
- Docker MCP catalogue. Not in the Docker MCP catalogue on 2026-11-19. Source: read 2026-11-19.
- Cline marketplace. Not in the Cline marketplace on 2026-11-19. Source: read 2026-11-19.
Own host
- security.txt. No security.txt at https://own-adam.onrender.com/.well-known/ (HTTP 200, 2026-11-19). Source: own-adam.onrender.com/.well-known/security.txt · read 2026-11-19.
- A2A agent card. No A2A agent card at https://own-adam.onrender.com/.well-known/ (HTTP 200, 2026-11-19). Source: own-adam.onrender.com/.well-known/agent-card.json · read 2026-11-19.
Read as text from published files and outside lists. Nothing was installed or run, and no tool was called. A fact, not a rating. How each fact is read
Does the registry listing match what we found?
Feature #6The registry checks an entry when it is published (each new version), and nothing re-checks it on a schedule. A difference below is about the listing, not a judgement of the publisher.
| Registry says | We found | Result | Source · date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remote endpoint own-adam.onrender.com/mcp | Session opened | matches | our test · 2026-11-19 |
| No credential declared as required | Opened a session without any credential | matches | our test · 2026-11-19 |
| Repository github.com/adamgraymon/Own_adam | Opens publicly | matches | api.github.com · 2026-11-19 |
Who made it?
Feature #7 · lineage
Facts about the publisher. We do not turn them into a trust score.
- Namespace
- io.github.adamgraymon · 12 servers
- GitHub owner
- a personal account (adamgraymon)
- Repository
- github.com/adamgraymon/Own_adam
- Stars
- 1
- Repository age
- 0–30 days
- Last push
- 0–30 days ago
- Archived
- no
- Security policy
- none found (we looked for SECURITY.md in the repository and in its owner’s .github repository)
Source: the registry entry and api.github.com · 2026-11-19; security policy read from GitHub · 2026-11-15.
Publish this server? Run these checks against it yourself before release, from your own machine: a server the command starts, or your own server at its URL after a one-time proof that you control it: npx protocolprobe-selftest.
Tool list changes
Our reads compared · no tool calledHosted endpoint own-adam.onrender.com/mcp
2 of 2 comparisons between consecutive reads showed a change (3 reads, 2026-11-15 to 2026-11-19; versions 0.5.0 to 0.8.0).
Last change seen between our reads on 2026-11-16 (version 0.7.0) and 2026-11-19 (version 0.8.0).
Added (5):
check_mcp_server_trustclaim_escrow_timeout_refundget_trust_dossier_samplematch_verified_buyers_by_intentreview_agent_skill_freeChanged (18):
audit_agent_skill_escrow: description, input schema, annotationsaudit_ai_inference_escrow: description, input schema, annotationsaudit_api_sla_escrow: description, input schema, annotationsaudit_depin_gpu_sla_escrow: description, input schema, annotationsaudit_quant_backtest_escrow: description, input schema, annotationsaudit_rag_embeddings_escrow: description, input schema, annotationsaudit_smart_contract_escrow: description, input schema, annotationsdiscover_verified_stores: description, input schema, annotationsinspect_veritas_8183_seal: description, input schema, annotationsmanage_buyer_finops_spend_passport: description, input schema, annotationsnotarize_and_witness_a2a_deal: description, input schema, annotationsopen_escrow_job: description, input schema, annotationspurchase_firstparty_catalog_item: description, input schema, annotationsquote_multitoken_escrow: description, input schema, annotationsregister_and_certify_store: description, input schema, annotationssubmit_encrypted_deliverable: description, input schema, annotationssubmit_veritas_tier_upgrade_exam: description, input schema, annotationsverify_onchain_escrow_status: description, input schema, annotationsCompared from the tool lists our read-only connection recorded, separately for each hosted endpoint and each package: each tool's name, title, description, input schema and annotations (the order of keys and of tools is ignored). We see a list only when we read it: a change is shown between the two reads where we first saw it, and anything after 2026-11-19 is not known yet. No tool was called. How it is compared
Choosing
Record checks
Public records · not a safety rating4 of 5 record checks met · 4 do not apply
- Not ranked by downloads: a remote server publishes no download figure
- Not ranked by stars: 1 star (ranked from 10)
- MetRegistry entry is active and says how to run itActive, with a package or a remote address.
- MetSource repository link opensThe linked GitHub repository is public.
- MetRepository is not archivedNot archived.
- MetCode pushed to the repository in the 90 days before our checkLast push 0-30 days before our check.
- Not metRepository publishes a security policy (SECURITY.md)No SECURITY.md in the places GitHub reads it from.What changes this check: GitHub's documentation describes adding a SECURITY.md from the repository's security settings: under Reporting, Security policy, Start setup. GitHub: adding a security policy
- Does not applyPackage names its licence with a standard (SPDX) identifierRemote server: it ships no package.
- Does not applyThe version the registry lists can be installed and is not withdrawnRemote server: it ships no package.
- Does not applynpm package carries build provenance (attestation)Remote server: it ships no package.
- Does not applyNo known critical or high advisory in the package or its dependenciesRemote server: it ships no package.
Read from public records only: the registry entry, npm/PyPI, GitHub and advisory databases, checked 2026-11-19 (security policy 2026-11-15). No tool was called. Only “met” and “not met” are counted, so the total differs between servers; a check that does not apply or that we could not run is listed, never counted against it. It is not a safety rating, and the same rules apply to every server. How each check works · Leaderboards · How we stay neutral
Common questions about io.github.adamgraymon/trustgate-erc8183-mcp
Answered from the data aboveWho publishes io.github.adamgraymon/trustgate-erc8183-mcp?
The registry ties the namespace io.github.adamgraymon to the GitHub account adamgraymon; only its owner can publish under it. Its linked repository, github.com/adamgraymon/Own_adam, belongs to the same GitHub account. These are facts from the registry and GitHub, not a rating.
Is io.github.adamgraymon/trustgate-erc8183-mcp safe to install?
We do not rate servers as safe or unsafe. 4 of its 5 applicable record checks are met (facts from public records, each listed on this page). What the records show: Its source repository opens publicly. Its repository had a push in the last 90 days. These are facts with their sources on this page, not a safety guarantee, and we did not run its tools.
Does io.github.adamgraymon/trustgate-erc8183-mcp need an API key or sign-in?
It opened a session without any credential on 2026-11-19. The registry entry declares no required credential; no declaration is not a guarantee.
Has io.github.adamgraymon/trustgate-erc8183-mcp been security tested?
Partly. 4 of the 15 checks that apply to it were exercised. It accepted a session without any credential and lists tools whose names suggest they change data. We did not call them. ProtocolProbe publishes no security verdict for a named server.
Does io.github.adamgraymon/trustgate-erc8183-mcp publish a security policy?
We found no SECURITY.md in its repository (root, .github/ or docs/) or in its owner's .github repository.
Where is the source code of io.github.adamgraymon/trustgate-erc8183-mcp?
In github.com/adamgraymon/Own_adam, which opens publicly.
Found this page useful?
Anonymous · no sign-inA quick, anonymous reaction — no account, no email. One per kind from your browser. The tally updates when the page is next refreshed, and it is only a rough count, never a safety rating or a measured number of people.
Compare with another server
Side by side: registry entry, our read-only session, the tools and the 18 classification fields. Same values as each page; no score.
Security testing
What did we test, and what did we leave out?
18 checks · features #1, #2
Open without sign-in
It accepted a session without any credential and lists tools whose names suggest they change data. We did not call them. No security score is given; a check we did not run is never counted as passed.
- Inventory: exercised
- Hidden instructions: exercised
- Real execution: not run · our policy
- Secret leak: not run · nothing to check it against
- Internal addresses: not run · our policy
- Unconfirmed changes: not run · our policy
- Bad input: not run · our policy
- Model requests: not run · nothing to check it against
- Sensitive questions: not run · nothing to check it against
- Folder boundary: not run · our policy
- Log leaks: not run · nothing to check it against
- Hidden content: exercised
- Fake assistant turns: not applicable
- Token passthrough: not applicable
- Token audience: not applicable
- Sign-in redirect: not run · our policy
- Consent handling: not testable from outside
- Sign-in metadata: exercised
4 exercised11 not run (reason given)3 not applicable
Each check ends in exactly one state: exercised, not run (with the reason), or not applicable (with the reason). 4 of the 15 checks that apply to it were exercised. We do not publish security-check outcomes for named servers. These 18 checks are separate from the record checks at the top of this page, which read public records only.
- 1Inventory
tool-listReads the declared tools, resources and prompts.exercised - 2Hidden instructions
description-poisoningLooks for hidden instructions in tool descriptions.exercised - 12Hidden content
audience-hidingChecks resources that hide content from the user.exercised - 18Sign-in metadata
oauth-url-schemeChecks the published sign-in metadata for unsafe URLs.exercised
- 3Real execution
real-executionCalls a tool and checks what really happens.This check calls the server's tools. ProtocolProbe calls no server's tools for anything it publishes, except for a server whose operator has claimed it and given permission (that server's page says so); an operator can run this check on their own server with our self-test command.not run · our policy - 4Secret leak
canary-leakPlants a fake secret and checks whether it leaks.This check needs at least one successful tool call to have something to check, and no tool was called.not run · nothing to check it against - 5Internal addresses
ssrfChecks whether a tool can be steered to internal addresses.This check calls the server's tools. ProtocolProbe calls no server's tools for anything it publishes, except for a server whose operator has claimed it and given permission (that server's page says so); an operator can run this check on their own server with our self-test command.not run · our policy - 6Unconfirmed changes
write-without-confirmationChecks whether tools that change data act without asking.This check calls the server's tools. ProtocolProbe calls no server's tools for anything it publishes, except for a server whose operator has claimed it and given permission (that server's page says so); an operator can run this check on their own server with our self-test command.not run · our policy - 7Bad input
error-handlingSends bad input and watches how the server answers.This check calls the server's tools. ProtocolProbe calls no server's tools for anything it publishes, except for a server whose operator has claimed it and given permission (that server's page says so); an operator can run this check on their own server with our self-test command.not run · our policy - 8Model requests
samplingChecks whether the server asks the client's model to act for it.This check needs at least one successful tool call to have something to check, and no tool was called.not run · nothing to check it against - 9Sensitive questions
elicitation-sensitive-dataChecks whether the server asks users for sensitive data.This check needs at least one successful tool call to have something to check, and no tool was called.not run · nothing to check it against - 10Folder boundary
root-boundaryChecks whether the server reaches outside the folders it was given.This check calls the server's tools. ProtocolProbe calls no server's tools for anything it publishes, except for a server whose operator has claimed it and given permission (that server's page says so); an operator can run this check on their own server with our self-test command.not run · our policy - 11Log leaks
logging-side-channelChecks whether log messages carry data they should not.This check needs at least one successful tool call to have something to check, and no tool was called.not run · nothing to check it against - 16Sign-in redirect
open-redirectChecks the sign-in redirect for abuse.Testing the sign-in redirect means sending probes to the operator's sign-in service, which we do not do.not run · our policy - 17Consent handling
confused-deputyChecks consent handling when one service acts for another.Depends on the operator's own consent screen, which differs per server and cannot be tested from outside.not testable from outside
- 13Fake assistant turns
fake-assistant-turnChecks prompts that pose as the assistant's own words.The server exposes no prompts.not applicable - 14Token passthrough
token-passthroughChecks whether the server forwards a user's token to other services.The server opened a session without sign-in, so there is no token flow to check.not applicable - 15Token audience
token-audience-validationChecks whether tokens meant for another service are accepted.The server opened a session without sign-in, so there is no token flow to check.not applicable
Source: our own test, 2026-11-19, mcp-runtime-engine@0.1.0. Which checks count and why follows our published scoring model.
What happened during the test?
Feature #8
The steps in order, as the test record holds them.
- 0 msStarted a read-only session with the server's remote endpoint
- 633 msConnected after 0 redirects. No credential was sent or needed.
- Read the inventory: 23 tools, 5 resources, 0 prompts.
- 5,274 msFinished: 4 checks exercised.
Reference
How is it classified?
18 fields
One value per field, each with its source. Fields written by AI models are marked. A field with no value says why.
“Not stated” means the source did not state it; “does not apply” means it does not apply to this kind of server; “our limit” means our own lookup failed. A linked value opens the directory filtered to the same value.
Cite or correct this page
Sources and corrections
Suggested citation
ProtocolProbe. “io.github.adamgraymon/trustgate-erc8183-mcp: MCP server record.” Data checked 2026-11-19. https://protocolprobe.com/mcp/servers/io.github.adamgraymon/trustgate-erc8183-mcp
Figures are valid for the date shown. Our facts on this page are CC BY 4.0: reuse them with a link and the check date. Quoted text (the publisher’s descriptions, website quotes, tool names) is not ours to license.
As JSON: this record in the API · API documentation.
Badge for your README
[](https://protocolprobe.com/mcp/servers/io.github.adamgraymon/trustgate-erc8183-mcp)
It shows this server's record-check count: facts from public records, no tool called. It is not a security rating or a pass. It links here and updates after each data reload.
Something wrong, or is this yours?
If a fact here is wrong, tell us and we will re-check it. If you operate this server, you can run our checks on it yourself with the free self-test command; we call no server’s tools ourselves for anything shown here, except for a server whose operator has claimed it and given permission (that server's page says so).
Write to hello@protocolprobe.com · corrections log · methodology