MCP servers › io.github.stand-out-of-my-sun › diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp
MCP server · registry snapshot 2026-10-23 · last tested 2026-10-23
io.github.stand-out-of-my-sun/diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp
Autonomous agent guardrails, bash sandboxing, MCP rugpull diffing & prompt firewalls. — the publisher's description
Summary
io.github.stand-out-of-my-sun/diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp is a remote MCP server listed in the official MCP registry at version 1.0.0. On 2026-10-23 ProtocolProbe connected to it in read-only mode and read its inventory: 12 tools, 0 resources and 0 prompts.
Record checks
5 of 5 record checks met · 4 do not apply
- met: Registry entry is active and says how to run it
- met: Source repository link opens
- met: Repository is not archived
- met: Code pushed to the repository in the 90 days before our check
- met: Repository publishes a security policy (SECURITY.md)
- not applicable: Package names its licence with a standard (SPDX) identifier
- not applicable: The version the registry lists can be installed and is not withdrawn
- not applicable: npm package carries build provenance (attestation)
- not applicable: No known critical or high advisory in the package or its dependencies
- Not ranked by downloads: a remote server publishes no download figure
- Not ranked by stars: 0 stars (ranked from 10)
From public records, not a safety rating. Each check with its reason · Is it safe to install?
Key facts
- Runs
- remote (hosted by the publisher)
- Transport
- streamable HTTP
- Sign-in
- none needed to open a session
- Repository
- public
- Tools
- 12
- Described as changing data
- 0 of 12 toolsAI-classified
- Mainly works on
- nothing outside itself: it only answers questionsAI-classified
- Topic
- securityAI-classified
- Last tested
- 2026-10-23
How fresh this is
- Live-tested
- yes, a real session (not a text-only review)
- Last tested
- 2026-10-23
- Mode
- read-only (no tool calls)
- Latest version
- 1.0.0, published 2026-10-20 (registry, as of the 2026-10-23 snapshot)
- First listed version
- 2026-10-20 (earliest version still in the registry; older removed versions would be earlier)
- Registry data
- snapshot 2026-10-23
- Package and repository
- checked 2026-10-23
- Engine
- mcp-runtime-engine@0.1.0 · sdk@1.32.0
Changes since the last refresh
New in the registry: not in the list of 2026-10-04, listed on 2026-10-23 with version 1.0.0 (published 2026-10-20).
Source: the official MCP Registry list on 2026-10-04 and on 2026-10-23.
What it is
What does this server offer?
Observed inventoryWhat it mainly works on, as our AI model read its tool descriptions: nothing outside itself: it only answers questions.
None of its 12 tools are described as changing anything. For 3 the reading was uncertain, so no mark is shown.
“Evaluates untrusted agent prompts, bash commands, and tool arguments to block prompt injection, destructive shell commands, and private-key exfiltration.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
2 inputs, 1 required
payloadstringrequired“Raw command string, script snippet, or untrusted prompt to inspect for safety violations.”action_typestring“Execution context of the payload; defaults to 'bash_command' when omitted.”
“Performs static AST syntax tree parsing on SQL statements to verify strictly read-only SELECT clauses and reject mutations, stacked queries, or comment bypasses.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
2 inputs, 1 required
sql_statementstringrequired“SQL statement string to statically parse and audit for read-only SELECT compliance (e.g.”dialectstring“SQL dialect ruleset used for AST token inspection; defaults to 'postgres' when omitted.”
“Audits Python source code for forbidden syscalls (os, subprocess, socket, open, eval) inside an AST-governed WebAssembly sandbox with no host filesystem access.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
2 inputs, 1 required
python_scriptstringrequired“Python 3 source script to audit and execute strictly inside an isolated AST-governed, non-privileged WebAssembly sandbox with no host filesystem access.”timeout_profilestring“Execution resource ceiling; defaults to 'standard_5s' when omitted.”
“Scans an external MCP server's initial tools/list manifest to detect tool-name shadowing (read_file, bash) and hidden prompt-injection directives in descriptions.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
2 inputs, 1 required
manifest_jsonstringrequired“JSON string or object containing the external MCP server's tools array to audit.”audit_profilestring“Sensitivity level for flagging system-tool name shadowing; defaults to 'strict' when omitted.”
“Computes structural diffs between a pinned baseline MCP tools/list snapshot and a live server response to catch mid-session description or schema tampering.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
3 inputs, 1 required
baseline_tools_jsonstringrequired“JSON-serialized baseline tools/list array captured when the MCP server was first trusted.”current_tools_jsonstring“JSON-serialized live tools/list array to compare against the baseline; defaults to '[]' when omitted.”diff_modestring“Comparison strictness across descriptions and inputSchema; defaults to 'full_structural' when omitted.”
“Audits inbound MCP sampling/createMessage callbacks from connected servers to block cross-server context snooping (includeContext='allServers') and token quota hijacking.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
2 inputs, 1 required
sampling_request_jsonstringrequired“JSON string or object representing the inbound MCP sampling/createMessage payload.”max_tokens_ceilingstring“Maximum completion token quota allowed for server callbacks; defaults to '2048' when omitted.”
“Sanitizes untrusted external tool or web-scrape outputs by stripping invisible Unicode Tag characters (U+E0000), neutralizing Markdown tracking image beacons, and defusing indirect prompt overrides.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
2 inputs, 1 required
raw_tool_outputstringrequired“Untrusted text returned by an external tool, webhook, or web scraper.”wrap_tagstring“XML isolation wrapper applied around the sanitized text; defaults to 'tool_data' when omitted.”
“Redacts emails, phone numbers, SSNs, credit cards, API keys, and crypto private keys from text before logging or external transmission.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
2 inputs, 1 required
textstringrequired“Input text containing potential PII or secret keys to redact.”redaction_stylestring“Placeholder format used for redacted spans; defaults to 'typed_token' when omitted.”
“Analyzes an agent's recent tool-call trace to detect identical retry spins, A/B state oscillation, and runaway token burn.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
2 inputs, 1 required
action_trace_jsonstringrequired“JSON-serialized array of recent agent actions (e.g.”sensitivitystring“Cycle detection threshold; defaults to 'standard_3_repeats' when omitted.”
“Verifies a remote agent's A2A /.well-known/agent.json discovery card, checking JWS/DID signature binding, endpoint HTTPS enforcement, and capability spoofing.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
2 inputs, 1 required
agent_card_jsonstringrequired“JSON string or object of the peer agent's /.well-known/agent.json descriptor.”trust_policystring“Verification policy for DID/DNS binding; defaults to 'require_https_and_did' when omitted.”
“Static validation firewall for outbound network destination URIs against cloud metadata IP addresses (169.254.169.254), RFC 1918 private IP blocks, and query-string secret exfiltration before agent d…”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
2 inputs, 1 required
destination_uristringrequired“Outbound HTTP/HTTPS destination URI to inspect before fetching (e.g.”egress_policystring“Network egress policy; defaults to 'block_private_and_metadata' when omitted.”
“Cross-references factual claims, numbers, and citations in a draft agent response against retrieved source passages to flag unsupported hallucinations before delivery.”
Publisher declares: read-only yes · destructive no · idempotent yes · open-world no
3 inputs, 2 required
claimstringrequired“Draft agent response or factual statement to verify for hallucinations.”contextstringrequired“Authoritative source text or retrieved RAG passages that the claim must be grounded in.”strictnessstring“Entailment threshold required for numbers and dates; defaults to 'exact_entailment' when omitted.”
Each quoted sentence is the first sentence of the publisher’s own description. The kind of tool and the “changes data” mark are our AI model’s reading of that description, not something we tested: two differently worded runs had to agree, otherwise no label is shown, and nobody has checked them by hand. A tool without the “changes data” mark is described as only reading, searching or calculating, or the two runs did not agree. No tool was called. Read the publisher’s full description before relying on it. “Publisher declares” lists the hints the server itself sends with the tool (MCP annotations: read-only, destructive, idempotent, open-world); they are the publisher's claims, not checked by us. Inputs are the parameters in the tool's own input schema: name, declared type, whether it is required, and the first sentence of its description. Read 2026-10-23.
How well are its tools described?
Features #4 and #5
How clearly this server's own tool descriptions say what a tool does, and how consistent its tool list is. The first part is an AI model's yes/no reading of each description; the second part is counted. We do not turn it into a grade.
Descriptions
AI reading of each description
- Says what the tool does
- 100% of 12 tools
- States limits, defaults or errors
- 100% of 12 tools
- Says when to use it
- 100% of 12 tools
- Items covered per tool
- 4.0 of 4 on average
Counted from the listing
- Parameters with a description
- 100% of 26
- Tools with a description
- 100% of 12
- Typical description length
- 562 characters
The tool set
Counted from the listing
- Tools
- 12
- Size of the list
- about 5,942 tokens for an agent to load (characters ÷ 4)
- Naming
- 12 of 12 names use snake_case
AI reading: easy to mix up
No pair found.
The AI items cover 12 of 12 tools: for a tool where two differently worded runs disagreed, that item is left out. They were not checked by hand, and no tool was called. “Easy to mix up” means two tools whose names or descriptions overlap without saying how they differ; the AI found none. We do not rate whether the tool set is complete or whether side effects are spelled out, because our AI reading of those was not reliable enough.
How do I add it to my client?
Config from the registry entry
From the remote endpoint (Streamable HTTP)
We connected to this URL on 2026-10-23 (a read-only session: no tool was called).
Add to CursorAn install link in the format Cursor documents, holding the Cursor config below.
Claude Desktop or claude.ai
Settings → Connectors → Add custom connector, then paste: https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/agent-guardrails
Cursor · .cursor/mcp.json in a project, or ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp": {
"url": "https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/agent-guardrails"
}
}
}VS Code · .vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/agent-guardrails"
}
}
}VS Code (command line) · Bash or zsh terminal (macOS, Linux)
code --add-mcp '{"name":"diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp","type":"http","url":"https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/agent-guardrails"}'Claude Code
claude mcp add --transport http diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/agent-guardrails
Try it in the MCP Inspector · runs on your machine, opens in your browser · Node 22.19+
npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector@2.11.0 --server-url https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/agent-guardrails --transport http
- The server runs on the operator's infrastructure; it may ask you to sign in when you first connect.
- The MCP Inspector lists the server's tools, resources and prompts; a tool you call there runs for real.
Built from the server's registry entry with each client's documented format (checked 2026-10-14; the Cursor link and the VS Code command 2026-10-19; the MCP Inspector command 2026-10-21). Values in < > are yours to fill in; this page never contains a key. Where the server needs a setting the entry does not declare, it can still fail to start.
Does the registry listing match what we found?
Feature #6The registry verifies a package once, when it is published, and does not re-check it. A difference below is about the listing, not a judgement of the publisher.
| Registry says | We found | Result | Source · date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remote endpoint diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/agent-guardrails | Session opened | matches | our test · 2026-10-23 |
| No credential declared as required | Opened a session without any credential | matches | our test · 2026-10-23 |
| Repository github.com/stand-out-of-my-sun/diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp | Opens publicly | matches | api.github.com · 2026-10-23 |
Who made it?
Feature #7 · lineage
Facts about the publisher. We do not turn them into a trust score.
- Namespace
- io.github.stand-out-of-my-sun · 6 servers
- GitHub owner
- a personal account (stand-out-of-my-sun)
- Repository
- github.com/stand-out-of-my-sun/diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp
- Stars
- 0
- Repository age
- 0–30 days
- Last push
- 0–30 days ago
- Archived
- no
- Security policy
- SECURITY.md
Source: the registry entry and api.github.com · 2026-10-23; security policy read from GitHub · 2026-10-23.
Publish this server? Run these checks against it yourself before release, from your own machine: a server the command starts, or your own server at its URL after a one-time proof that you control it: npx protocolprobe-selftest.
Choosing
Record checks
Public records · not a safety rating5 of 5 record checks met · 4 do not apply
- Not ranked by downloads: a remote server publishes no download figure
- Not ranked by stars: 0 stars (ranked from 10)
- MetRegistry entry is active and says how to run itActive, with a package or a remote address.
- MetSource repository link opensThe linked GitHub repository is public.
- MetRepository is not archivedNot archived.
- MetCode pushed to the repository in the 90 days before our checkLast push 0-30 days before our check.
- MetRepository publishes a security policy (SECURITY.md)SECURITY.md found.
- Does not applyPackage names its licence with a standard (SPDX) identifierRemote server: it ships no package.
- Does not applyThe version the registry lists can be installed and is not withdrawnRemote server: it ships no package.
- Does not applynpm package carries build provenance (attestation)Remote server: it ships no package.
- Does not applyNo known critical or high advisory in the package or its dependenciesRemote server: it ships no package.
Read from public records only: the registry entry, npm/PyPI, GitHub and advisory databases, checked 2026-10-23. No tool was called. Only “met” and “not met” are counted, so the total differs between servers; a check that does not apply or that we could not run is listed, never counted against it. It is not a safety rating. How each check works · Leaderboards
Common questions about io.github.stand-out-of-my-sun/diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp
Answered from the data aboveIs io.github.stand-out-of-my-sun/diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp safe to install?
We do not rate servers as safe or unsafe. 5 of its 5 applicable record checks are met (facts from public records, each listed on this page). What the records show: Its source repository opens publicly. Its repository had a push in the last 90 days. These are facts with their sources on this page, not a safety guarantee, and we did not run its tools.
Does io.github.stand-out-of-my-sun/diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp need an API key or sign-in?
It opened a session without any credential on 2026-10-23. The registry entry declares no required credential; no declaration is not a guarantee.
Has io.github.stand-out-of-my-sun/diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp been security tested?
Partly. 2 of the 14 checks that apply to it were exercised. We connected and read what the server declares, but did not call its tools: ProtocolProbe calls no server's tools for anything it publishes. This is our choice, not a block by the server. No security verdict is published before verification.
What can io.github.stand-out-of-my-sun/diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp do?
It lists 12 tools. In our AI model's reading of their descriptions (two runs had to agree, nobody checked it by hand), they include tools that read or search, run code or commands and calculate or convert. We did not call any tool, so this describes the text, not the behaviour.
Can io.github.stand-out-of-my-sun/diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp change or delete data?
None of its 12 tools is described as changing anything (our AI model's reading of the descriptions; nobody checked it by hand). We did not call any tool.
Does io.github.stand-out-of-my-sun/diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp publish a security policy?
Yes: its repository has a public security policy (github.com/stand-out-of-my-sun/diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp/blob/HEAD/SECURITY.md). That is the publisher's statement, not permission for us to test the server, and we call none of its tools.
Where is the source code of io.github.stand-out-of-my-sun/diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp?
In github.com/stand-out-of-my-sun/diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp, which opens publicly.
Found this page useful?
Anonymous · no sign-inA quick, anonymous reaction — no account, no email. One per kind from your browser. The tally updates when the page is next refreshed, and it is only a rough count, never a safety rating or a measured number of people.
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Compare with another server
Side by side: registry entry, our read-only session, the tools and the 18 classification fields. Same values as each page; no score.
Security testing
What did we test, and what did we leave out?
18 checks · features #1, #2
Not probed (we call no server's tools)
We connected and read what the server declares, but did not call its tools: ProtocolProbe calls no server's tools for anything it publishes. This is our choice, not a block by the server. No security score is given; a check we did not run is never counted as passed.
- Inventory: exercised
- Hidden instructions: exercised
- Real execution: not run · our policy
- Secret leak: not run · nothing to check it against
- Internal addresses: not run · our policy
- Unconfirmed changes: not run · our policy
- Bad input: not run · our policy
- Model requests: not run · nothing to check it against
- Sensitive questions: not run · nothing to check it against
- Folder boundary: not run · our policy
- Log leaks: not run · nothing to check it against
- Hidden content: not run · nothing to check it against
- Fake assistant turns: not applicable
- Token passthrough: not applicable
- Token audience: not applicable
- Sign-in redirect: not run · our policy
- Consent handling: not testable from outside
- Sign-in metadata: not applicable
2 exercised12 not run (reason given)4 not applicable
Each check ends in exactly one state: exercised, not run (with the reason), or not applicable (with the reason). 2 of the 14 checks that apply to it were exercised. We do not publish security-check outcomes for named servers.
- 1Inventory
tool-listReads the declared tools, resources and prompts.exercised - 2Hidden instructions
description-poisoningLooks for hidden instructions in tool descriptions.exercised
- 3Real execution
real-executionCalls a tool and checks what really happens.This check calls the server's tools. ProtocolProbe calls no server's tools for anything it publishes; an operator can run this check on their own server with our self-test command.not run · our policy - 4Secret leak
canary-leakPlants a fake secret and checks whether it leaks.This check needs at least one successful tool call to have something to check, and no tool was called.not run · nothing to check it against - 5Internal addresses
ssrfChecks whether a tool can be steered to internal addresses.This check calls the server's tools. ProtocolProbe calls no server's tools for anything it publishes; an operator can run this check on their own server with our self-test command.not run · our policy - 6Unconfirmed changes
write-without-confirmationChecks whether tools that change data act without asking.This check calls the server's tools. ProtocolProbe calls no server's tools for anything it publishes; an operator can run this check on their own server with our self-test command.not run · our policy - 7Bad input
error-handlingSends bad input and watches how the server answers.This check calls the server's tools. ProtocolProbe calls no server's tools for anything it publishes; an operator can run this check on their own server with our self-test command.not run · our policy - 8Model requests
samplingChecks whether the server asks the client's model to act for it.This check needs at least one successful tool call to have something to check, and no tool was called.not run · nothing to check it against - 9Sensitive questions
elicitation-sensitive-dataChecks whether the server asks users for sensitive data.This check needs at least one successful tool call to have something to check, and no tool was called.not run · nothing to check it against - 10Folder boundary
root-boundaryChecks whether the server reaches outside the folders it was given.This check calls the server's tools. ProtocolProbe calls no server's tools for anything it publishes; an operator can run this check on their own server with our self-test command.not run · our policy - 11Log leaks
logging-side-channelChecks whether log messages carry data they should not.This check needs at least one successful tool call to have something to check, and no tool was called.not run · nothing to check it against - 12Hidden content
audience-hidingChecks resources that hide content from the user.This check needs content the server returns, and nothing was read or called.not run · nothing to check it against - 16Sign-in redirect
open-redirectChecks the sign-in redirect for abuse.Testing the sign-in redirect means sending probes to the operator's sign-in service, which we do not do.not run · our policy - 17Consent handling
confused-deputyChecks consent handling when one service acts for another.Depends on the operator's own consent screen, which differs per server and cannot be tested from outside.not testable from outside
- 13Fake assistant turns
fake-assistant-turnChecks prompts that pose as the assistant's own words.The server exposes no prompts.not applicable - 14Token passthrough
token-passthroughChecks whether the server forwards a user's token to other services.The server opened a session without sign-in, so there is no token flow to check.not applicable - 15Token audience
token-audience-validationChecks whether tokens meant for another service are accepted.The server opened a session without sign-in, so there is no token flow to check.not applicable - 18Sign-in metadata
oauth-url-schemeChecks the published sign-in metadata for unsafe URLs.No sign-in (OAuth) metadata is published, so there are no sign-in addresses to check.not applicable
Source: our own test, 2026-10-23, mcp-runtime-engine@0.1.0. Which checks count and why follows our published scoring model.
What happened during the test?
Feature #8
The steps in order, as the test record holds them.
- 0 msStarted a read-only session with the server's remote endpoint
- 253 msConnected after 0 redirects. No credential was sent or needed.
- Read the inventory: 12 tools, 0 resources, 0 prompts.
- 964 msFinished: 2 checks exercised.
Reference
How is it classified?
18 fields
One value per field, each with its source. Fields written by AI models are marked. A field with no value says why.
“Not stated” means the source did not state it; “does not apply” means it does not apply to this kind of server; “our limit” means our own lookup failed. A linked value opens the directory filtered to the same value.
Cite or correct this page
Sources and corrections
Suggested citation
ProtocolProbe. “io.github.stand-out-of-my-sun/diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp: MCP server record.” Data checked 2026-10-23. https://protocolprobe.com/mcp/servers/io.github.stand-out-of-my-sun/diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp
Figures are valid for the date shown. Our facts on this page are CC BY 4.0: reuse them with a link and the check date. Quoted text (the publisher’s descriptions, website quotes, tool names) is not ours to license.
As JSON: this record in the API · API documentation.
Badge for your README
[](https://protocolprobe.com/mcp/servers/io.github.stand-out-of-my-sun/diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp)
It shows this server's record-check count: facts from public records, no tool called. It is not a security rating or a pass. It links here and updates after each data reload.
Something wrong, or is this yours?
If a fact here is wrong, tell us and we will re-check it. If you operate this server, you can run our checks on it yourself with the free self-test command; we call no server’s tools ourselves for anything shown here.
Write to hello@protocolprobe.com · corrections log · methodology